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ABSTRACT 
 
The adoption of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights represents a watershed moment in the business and 
human rights movement.  Nevertheless, despite its achievements, 
the work to align business and human rights issues remains. 
One approach to furthering the work in this area has been to 
focus on the establishment of a new international binding treaty on 
business and human rights issues.  Treaty proponents view a bind-
ing treaty as a mechanism by which existing gaps in human rights 
protection can be closed.  Yet critics are skeptical.  They point to 
the lack of treaty support by states which are headquarters for 
multinational corporations, and worry about the diminishment of 
aspired treaty rights during the treaty negotiation process, as evi-
dence of their concerns.  
This article questions whether there is a need for a “new” in-
ternational business and human rights treaty.  Instead it argues 
that the linkage of business and human rights issues can be made 
by way of international investment agreements (IIAs).  Given the 
bilateral or regional nature of IIAs, multilateral state support is 
lessened, facilitating adoption of new principles or rights.  Moreo-
ver, IIAs offer a robust enforcement mechanism, through interna-
                                                 
 Associate Professor, University College London.  An earlier version of this arti-
cle was presented at the inaugural Business and Human Rights Conference hosted 
by Rutgers University.  Thanks are due to the conference participants for their 
valuable comments. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
  
426 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
tional arbitration, which can provide effective remedies.  In addi-
tion, because multinational corporations are often reliant on IIAs to 
gain access to new markets, IIAs can be used as a tool to impose 
human rights obligations onto corporations from the outset before 
abuses occur.  Most importantly, reconfiguring IIAs to adopt the 
BHR agenda ensures that norm development in business areas 
does not undermine human rights issues when these two areas in-
tersect, and that corporate rights stand in parallel to corporate ob-
ligations. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
For a number of years, members of a private security force be-
longing to Canadian corporation Barrick Gold have abused and as-
saulted individuals in the area around the Porgera mine, one of the 
world’s top producing gold mines, situated in Papua New Guinea 
and owned by Barrick Gold.1  After the abuses, the victims turned 
to Barrick Gold to seek redress, but were rebuffed when the com-
pany initially absolved itself of any responsibility.  They were also 
not able to turn to Papua New Guinea law enforcement or the 
courts, who were too corrupt or unable to offer the victims a prop-
er remedy.2  As a result, the Porgera mine victims found them-
selves without a remedy. 
The lack of remedy for the Porgera mine victims is not an iso-
lated event.  Instead, the incident is representative of a growing 
governance gap in the area of business and human rights.  As 
globalization continues to expand corporate activities into the far 
reaches of the world, more and more multinational corporations 
are operating in states that—despite being responsible for protect-
ing its peoples’ human rights—cannot or choose not to protect its 
people.  This failure to protect can leave human rights victims of 
corporate acts left without any forum for redress. 
For several states, international organizations, NGOs, and con-
cerned individuals, the solution to this problem can be found in the 
establishment of a binding international instrument on business 
and human rights.3  This business and human rights (BHR) treaty, 
                                                 
1 Gold’s Costly Dividend: Human Rights Impacts of Papua New Guinea’s Porgera 
Gold Mine, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH at 5 (Feb. 1, 2011), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2011/02/01/golds-costly-dividend/human-rights-impacts-papua-new-
guineas-porgera-gold-mine [https://perma.cc/W5L5-5AJM]. 
2 Papua New Guinea: Country Summary, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/papua-new-guinea 
[https://perma.cc/83GB-UKNA]. 
3 See generally Letter to Special Representative John Ruggie: 151 Human Rights 
Organizations, Socially Responsible Investment Groups, and Concerned Individuals 
Share their Views, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 9, 2007, http://www.hrw.org/
news/2007/10/09/letter-special-representative-john-ruggie [https://perma.cc/
CBQ7-B6QX] (asking Professor Ruggie, the UN Special Representative of the Sec-
retary-General on Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Busi-
nesses Enterprises, to “help to spread awareness of the compelling need for global 
standards on business and human rights to be outlined in a UN declaration or 
similar instrument adopted by member states.”); Advancing the Global Business and 
Human Rights Agenda: Sign-on Statement to the Human Rights Council from 55 Civil 
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they argue, will close gaps in the international legal order that un-
dermine human rights, and will increase clarity on applicable 
standards for corporations.4    
Nevertheless, support for the proposed BHR treaty remains 
shaky.  While there remains interest in further aligning business 
and human rights issues, many believe that a binding BHR treaty 
is not the best way forward.5  For some, this is a result of the lack of 
                                                                                                               
Society Organizations, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 13, 2011, http://
www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/13/advancing-global-business-and-human-rights-
agenda [https://perma.cc/UC65-UESL] (offering, in his [Professor Ruggie’s] final 
report before the Council, “numerous suggestions to States and companies in the 
form of ‘Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the UN “Protect, Respect, 
Remedy” Framework.’”); Joint Statement: Call for an international legally binding in-
strument on human rights, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
PEOPLE’S FORUM ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS (Nov. 2013), 
http://peoplesforum.escr-net.org/joint-statement-binding-international-
instrument [https://perma.cc/DJ6B-VSSQ] (noting that a People’s forum (located 
in Bangkok) called “upon the States to elaborate an international treaty” to, 
among other things, affirm “the applicability of human rights obligations to the 
operations of transnational corporations and other business enterprises”); Latin 
American and Caribbean Regional Forum on Business and Human Rights, Decla-
ration of Alternative Forum on Business and Human Rights in Colombia, GLOBAL 
POLICY FORUM, Sep. 12, 2013, https://www.globalpolicy.org/global-taxes/52481-
declaration-of-alternative-forum-on-business-and-human-rights-in-colombia.html 
[https://perma.cc/MV9P-EFQK]; Global Movement for a Binding Treaty, TREATY 
ALLIANCE (2015), http://www.treatymovement.com/ [https://perma.cc/YLT9-
JU54] (calling “for an enhanced global regulatory framework for the accountabil-
ity of TNCs-OBEs and improved access to justice by victims of corporate abuse.”). 
4 See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working 
Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises With Respect To 
Human Rights, U.N.Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, at ¶4 (July 10, 2015) [hereinafter 
Working Group Report] (discussing the influence of “action[s] or omissions of 
TNCs and other business enterprises” on human rights violations); 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, NEEDS AND OPTIONS FOR A NEW 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT IN THE FIELD OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 15 (June 
2014) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS] (determining that there 
is a lack of “accountability of companies” and “access to effective remedies for 
victims of abuse,” which affects human rights); Jolyon Ford, Business and Human 
Rights: Emerging Challenges to Consensus and Coherence, CHATHAM HOUSE: THE 
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Feb. 2015, at 2-3 (illustrating the cur-
rent developments within business and human rights discourse). 
5 For example, the U.S. boycotted deliberations on a binding treaty, the EU 
set parameters on its participation and then walked out on the second day, and 
Russia stated it did not support a binding treaty.  See generally John G. Ruggie, Get 
Real Or We'll Get Nothing: Reflections On The First Session Of The Intergovernmental 
Working Group On A Business And Human Rights Treaty, BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, 2015, http://business-humanrights.org/en/get-real-or-
well-get-nothing-reflections-on-the-first-session-of-the-intergovernmental-
working-group-on-a-business-and-human-rights-treaty [https://perma.cc/ECD8-
RTYV]; Chip Pitts, "Ready, Steady, Debate!": Treaty Talks Begin at UN, BUSINESS AND 
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state support for the treaty,6 while others focus on the diminish-
ment of human rights obligations that would ensue from the large 
number of issues a binding treaty would need to contain in order 
to be meaningful.7  There is also concern that drafting a BHR treaty 
is a retreat to past practices, which failed in seeking to link BHR is-
sues previously.8  
Against this background, this article questions the need for a 
“new” business and human rights treaty.  Instead it argues that the 
legalization of business and human rights issues, that treaty pro-
ponents desire, should be made in international investment 
agreements (IIAs).  As these agreements are bilateral or regional in 
nature, they supplant the need for multilateral support, that a new 
business and human rights treaty seems to lack.  In addition, they 
offer a robust enforcement mechanism, which can provide effective 
remedies, and can also be used as a tool to impose human rights 
obligations onto MNCs from the outset before abuses occur.  Most 
importantly, however, inserting business and human rights issues 
into IIAs ensures both that norm development in business areas 
does not undermine human rights issues when these two areas in-
tersect, and that the corporate rights found in IIAs stand in parallel 
to corporate obligations.  
The article makes this argument in four parts.  In Part 2 it ex-
                                                                                                               
HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, 2015, http://business-humanrights.org/en/
ready-steady-debate-treaty-talks-begin-at-un [https://perma.cc/38FB-E5RW]. 
6 Notable countries that have voted against a treaty are the U.S, the U.K., 
France, and Germany.  See Ford, supra note 4, at 4 (reporting that a large number 
of countries were either against or abstaining to Resolution I on business and hu-
man rights); John G. Ruggie, A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty?, HARVARD 
KENNEDY SCHOOL, Jan. 28, 2014, at 3, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/CSRI/UNBusinessandHumanRightsTreaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDG7-
NJLB] (reasoning that setting principles that reflect current law are easier for 
states to implement than principles that propose new rules). 
7 See Ford, supra note 4, at 3 (discussing a lack of interest from states to en-
gage in “highly ambitious” negotiations); Chris Esdaile, Does the World Need a 
Treaty on Business and Human Rights?, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE 
CENTRE, May 14, 2014, at 1, http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/
media/documents/chris_esdaile_ndu_talk_may2014_full_text.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CD7V-R5DR] (stating that state support in the non-binding UN Guid-
ing Principles does not mean that states would be as supportive to binding rules); 
Ruggie, supra note 6, at 3 (opining that one legal document would not suffice to 
capture all of the complex issues surrounding business and human rights). 
8 Consensus on Business and Human Rights is Broken with the Adoption of the Ec-
uador Initiative, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF EMPLOYERS, June 26, 2014, 
http://www.ioe-emp.org/index.php?id=1238 [https://perma.cc/HCH8-G5HZ] 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF EMPLOYERS]. 
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plores the importance of linking business and human rights issues, 
and describes previous attempts in the international arena to estab-
lish this linkage.  In particular, it examines the importance of pre-
venting international law from continuing to evolve in a fragment-
ed approach, and why this approach is particularly harmful to the 
business and human rights movement.  
Part 3 moves to explore the most recent attempts to link busi-
ness and human rights issue through the proposed BHR treaty.  It 
examines the advantages such a treaty could bestow, and evaluates 
these against the problems—both substantive and procedural—
that such a treaty faces. 
Part 4 turns to examine the IIA landscape as an alternative.  It 
examines the main features of IIAs and discusses how the key 
components of the business and human rights agenda can be in-
serted into them.  This Part also draws analogies from the experi-
ences that international investment law has encountered with hu-
man rights issues to the broader BHR movement. 
Finally, in Part 5, the article moves to discuss whether IIAs are 
well suited to adopting the business and human rights agenda.  In 
particular, it argues that refocusing IIAs on human rights issues 
may be able to progress the business and human rights agenda fur-
ther than a treaty solely devoted to business and human rights. 
 
2.  LINKING BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Increasingly, the idea that business and human rights are two 
self-contained issues that operate in isolation from one another is 
becoming less accepted.  In the wake of the Rana Plaza disaster,9 
human trafficking allegations in the shrimp industry,10 or recent 
                                                 
9 Julfikar Ali Manik & Jim Yardley, Building Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves 
Scores Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/
world/asia/bangladesh-building-collapse.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9PVB-
T8QM] (discussing the Rana Plaza disaster where a “building housing several fac-
tories making clothing for European and American consumers collapsed into a 
deadly heap… only five months after a horrific fire at a similar facility prompted 
leading multinational brands to pledge to work to improve safety in the country’s 
booming but poorly regulated garment industry.”). 
10 Margie Mason et al., Shrimp sold by global supermarkets is peeled by slave la-
bourers in Thailand, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 14, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/
global-development/2015/dec/14/shrimp-sold-by-global-supermarkets-is-
peeled-by-slave-labourers-in-thailand [https://perma.cc/DC26-XNXF] (discuss-
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revelations that ExxonMobil executives were knowledgeable about 
human rights abuses in Indonesia,11 it is becoming harder to resist 
the idea that business and human rights issues should operate con-
currently. 
Yet international efforts to link business and human rights is-
sues have repeatedly encountered a difficult path.  Despite the 
recognition of the importance of regulating the impacts of multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) as early as in the period following the 
Second World War,12 efforts to link business and human rights is-
sues have been fraught with failure.  
In part, efforts to coordinate business and human rights issues 
at the international level have been hampered by the development 
of business and human rights laws as self-contained or specialized 
regimes.13  In many ways, the law governing international business 
issues and international human rights law have developed in rela-
tive isolation from each other.  As a result, the specialized rules of 
each of these regimes may not only be non-cognizant of the objec-
tives of the other regime, but they may operate in ways that actual-
ly undermine the other regime’s objectives or other general princi-
ples of public international law. 
The next section examines how the fragmented development of 
international law relating to business issues and to human rights 
issues may impact on the coherence of the law on business and 
human rights.  It then moves to contrast the development of inter-
national investment law, which governs many aspects of business 
                                                                                                               
ing an investigation which “follow[ed] the trail of shrimp prepared by captive 
workers in squalid factories into the supply chain for food outlets in the US, Asia 
and Europe”); NY Times Editorial Board, Slavery and the Shrimp on Your Plate: Thai 
Seafood Is Contaminated by Human Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/thai-seafood-is-
contaminated-by-human-trafficking.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/HBN2-DSU7]. 
11 Douglas Gillision, Exxon Human Rights Case Survives — on Claim that Execs 
Knew All Along, 100REPORTERS (July 16, 2015), https://100r.org/2015/07/exxon-
human-rights-case-survives-claim-that-execs-knew-all-along/ [https://perma.cc/
5GP9-Y47A] (reporting on allegations that Exxon executives “knowingly hired 
and supported local military forces who tortured, killed and sexually assaulted 
the [Aceh province] villagers” in order to protect high-volume operations on the 
local gas field).  
12 Helen Keller, Codes of Conduct and their Implementation: The Question of Legit-
imacy in RÜDIGER WOLFRUM & VOLKER RÖBEN, EDS., LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 219, 223 (2008).  
13 See generally International Law Commission, Fragmentation Of International 
Law: Difficulties Arising From The Diversification And Expansion Of International Law, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006). 
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activities at the international level, with the development of inter-
national human rights law, in an effort to elucidate on the specific 
problems for business and human rights that these specialized re-
gimes may pose. 
 
2.1.  The Fragmented Development of International Law 
 
        Given that the world, unlike states, lacks a legislative 
body, it is not surprising that international law has tended to de-
velop in response to regional or functional needs.14  As the Study 
Group of the International Law Commission (ILC) has recognized, 
globalization has led to “…increasing fragmentation—that is, to 
the emergence of specialized and relatively autonomous spheres of 
social action and structure… [which in turn] has been accompanied 
by the emergence of specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules 
or rule-complexes, legal institutions and spheres of legal prac-
tice.”15  The problem with such fragmentation, the ILC Study 
Group notes, is that these specialist areas develop their own prin-
ciples and institutions without any recognition of either adjoining 
fields or the general principles and practices of international law.  
This can lead to conflicts between rules, contradictory institutional 
practices, and a lack of coherence in the law.16  
For issues relating to business and human rights, the problems 
identified by the ILC Study Group relating to a fragmented devel-
opment of international law are readily apparent.  Indeed, these 
problems are pronounced as both areas constitute a specialized re-
gime—a system of rules that is designed around a functional spe-
cialization and that is designed to supplant general principles with 
special rules and techniques of interpretation and administration.17  
International business law,18 and human rights law are, in fact, the 
                                                 
14 Id. at ¶5 (discussing that fragmentation stems in part from the separate sys-
tems of municipal law). 
15 Id. at ¶¶7-8 (describing what has been called “functional differentiation” as 
“the increasing specialization of parts of society and the related autonomization of 
those parts.”). 
16 Id. at ¶8 (discussing the problem of having specialized law that is ignorant 
to “adjoining fields”). 
17 Id. at ¶¶128-9 (describing the varying notions of a “self-contained regime” 
to demonstrate the difficulty of fusing two international fields). 
18 Although international business law comprises a number of different are-
as, the article focuses only on international investment and trade law. 
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quintessential definitions of a specialized regime.19 
However, the ILC Study Group cautions that specialized re-
gimes cannot operate in a legal vacuum or operate in “clinical iso-
lation” from general principles of public international law.20  In-
stead, rights and obligations arising from the specialized regime 
should be situated within the overall context of general interna-
tional law, including relevant adjoining specialized regimes.21 
The ILC Study Group’s conclusions confirm that despite busi-
ness and human rights issues evolving in separate regimes from 
one another, rules from one regime should be situated within the 
context of the other.  Thus, international business law should ac-
commodate human rights and vice-versa.  Yet until recently, this 
accommodation has been modest at best. 
 
2.2.  The Evolution of Business and Human Rights Issues 
 
International law governing business issues has evolved with-
out much acknowledgement of human rights issues, while interna-
tional human rights law has similarly evolved without recognition 
of the role of business in this area.  While this might be seen as a 
natural development given the functional specialization of these 
two seemingly disparate areas, it is telling that as early as the post-
World War II period, there had been at least some recognition of 
the need to regulate multinational corporations, including in rela-
tion to development goals.22  
For the most part, business issues have evolved in their own 
regime; human rights in their own; and to a lesser extent, attempts 
have been made to develop principles and rules for business and 
human rights issues, as a bipartite issue.  Yet legalization of BHR 
issues in its own specialized regime remains far less developed 
                                                 
19 The ILC Report even uses international trade law and human rights law as 
case studies for specialized regimes in its report. 
20 Id. at ¶¶163, 165 (illustrating that specialized regimes must be “interpreted 
as far as possible in harmony with other principles of international law”). 
21 Id. at ¶¶170, 174 (discussing interpretation of the WTO with international 
human rights principles as an example). 
22 See e.g., Keller, supra note 12, at 223 (noting that “[a]fter the initial, post-
World War II period in which many developing countries welcomed foreign di-
rect investment (FDI), attitudes changed in the later 1960s as developing countries 
became increasingly critical of TNCs for their failure to operate in harmony with 
local economic, social and political objectives.”)  
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than equivalent laws in business or human rights areas. 
 
2.2.1.  The Development of Specialized Regimes for International 
Business and for International Human Rights Laws 
 
The law governing international business activities is, to a large 
extent, contained in both international trade and international in-
vestment law.  Both have origins that date back a number of years.  
International trade law originated in the Havana Charter of the In-
ternational Trade Organization (ITO), the predecessor to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  The ITO was created 
as a mechanism to prevent the economic causes of war,23 but fo-
cused mainly on encouraging capital and trade flows and reducing 
tariffs.24  Although it contained one reference to labor rights, the 
Havana Charter did not address human right issues.25   
After the failure of the ITO, the GATT carried on the objectives 
of the Havana Charter and introduced limited and conditional ex-
ceptions to trade obligations,26 including in relation to the protec-
tion of human health.27  Nevertheless, neither the GATT nor any 
other WTO agreement made any specific reference to human 
rights.   
Similarly, the predecessor to international investment agree-
                                                 
23 Interim Commission for International Trade Organization, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, Final Act and Related Documents, 
U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78, arts. 1, 8 (Apr. 1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter]. 
24 Id. at art. 1 (regarding the purposes and objectives of the Act). 
25 Id. at art. 7 (regarding fair labor standards).    
26 United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439-36S/345, ¶ 5.9 
(Nov. 7, 1989) (providing in Article XX(d) “for a limited and conditional exception 
from obligations under other provisions”). 
27 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:  …  (b) necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health.   
While human rights is not specifically mentioned within the text of Article 
XX, other relevant exceptions to the GATT relating to human rights are the protec-
tion of public morals (Art. XX (a)) or relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources (Art. XX (d)).  
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ments, treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation,28  fo-
cused on trade and shipping facilitations as well as protection of 
foreign investments.29  By the 1960s, the modern era of internation-
al investment agreements had emerged and their focus was mainly 
on the creation of favourable investment climates and the promo-
tion of economic development.30  However, neither the FCN trea-
ties nor the post-FCN investment agreements referenced human 
rights. 
International human rights law has also evolved without 
recognition of the role of business.  The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,31the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,32 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights33 do not make any reference to the role of business in 
protecting or respecting human rights.  Neither do any of the other 
core human rights treaties including the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ,34 or the Conven-
tion against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment,35 among others, save for one solitary reference in the 
Convention on the Elimination on all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women.36  
                                                 
28 See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 182 
(3rd ed. 2010) (citing KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
POLICY AND PRACTICE (1992)). 
29 See Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24(3) INT'L LAW. 
655, 656 (1990) (discussing the history of bilateral investment treaties). 
30 Bilateral investment treaties were initially formulated only between devel-
oped and developing states, but the North American Free Trade Agreement and 
the Energy Charter further developed the concept of investment treaties also be-
tween developed states.  See generally RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (2nd ed. 2012). 
31 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 271A (III) U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (ignoring the role of business in the protection and 
application of international human rights). 
32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
33 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976). 
34 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965) (entered into 
force Jan. 4, 1969). 
35 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) 
(entered into force June 26, 1987). 
36 See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
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Yet while international investment, international trade, and in-
ternational human rights developed into specialized regimes with 
their own set of rules and institutions, efforts were underway to 
develop a third specialized regime—business and human rights—
although with considerably less success. 
 
2.2.2.  Efforts to Develop a Specialized Business and Human Rights 
Regime 
 
Efforts to link business and human rights issues were initially 
driven by an attempt to control the power of multinational corpo-
rations over the sovereign power of states.  In the late 1970s, devel-
oping countries proposed the creation of the United Nations Draft 
Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations as a way to coun-
ter the economic influence of multinational corporations.37  Among 
other provisions, the UN Draft Code contained a provision rec-
ommending multinational corporations to respect human rights.38  
The UN Draft Code was subject to years of negotiations and disa-
greements between developed and developing countries, and was 
eventually abandoned.39 
In response to these efforts, OECD countries developed their 
own format for MNC regulation.  The OECD Declaration on Interna-
tional Investment and Multinational Enterprises40 was released in 1976 
                                                                                                               
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, Article 2, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979) (“Parties 
… agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of elimi-
nating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake…(e) To take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, 
organization or enterprise”). 
37 See Karl P. Sauvant, The Negotiations of the United Nations Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations, 16 J. OF WORLD INV. & TRADE 11, 12-13 (2015) (discussing 
the tools governing transnational corporations).  See also Keller, supra note 12, at 
223; JOHN M. KLINE, THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN CHILE'S 
TRANSITION: BEYOND DEPENDENCY AND BARGAINING (1992). 
38 See Commission on Transnational Corporations, Draft United Nations Code 
of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, art. 13 (1983) (recommending that multi-
national corporations should respect international norms of human rights).  
39  Keller, supra note 12, at 223.  See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, 
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT, 33 (2009) 
(discussing the OECD Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property). 
40 OECD, International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (1976) re-
printed in ROGER BLANPAIN, THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS 1976–1979: EXPERIENCE AND REVIEW, 35 (1979) 
(stating the terms of the Committee on International Investment and Multination-
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and included guidelines for multinational enterprises, which urged 
them to make positive contributions to economic and social pro-
gress.41  However, these voluntary guidelines did not make any 
reference to human rights.  
In the ensuing years, multinational conduct relating to labor is-
sues was clarified by the International Labour Organization with 
its Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enter-
prises and Social Policy.42  Yet, during the same time period, efforts 
to produce principles of conduct relating to technology transfer43 
and to illicit payments44 both failed.  Indeed, while negotiations on 
the U.N. Draft Code continued in parallel during this period—until 
their eventual abandonment in 1994—international efforts to link 
business and human rights issues remained mainly dormant. 
However, in 1998, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights instituted a three-year working 
group to explore the activities of MNCs.45  The working group de-
cided to draft a code of conduct for MNCs that eventually became 
the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (“U.N. 
Norms”).46  The U.N. Norms represented the first non-voluntary 
initiative to detail obligations on business and human rights.  Nev-
ertheless, due to opposition to the U.N. Norms, particularly by 
                                                                                                               
al Enterprises).  
41 See OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 969 ¶ 12 
(1976) (stating that Multinational Enterprises should contribute towards the eco-
nomic and social progress of the states). 
42 See ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enter-
prises and Social Policy, 17 I.L.M. 422 (1978) (providing guidance to enterprises on 
social policy and inclusive, responsible and sustainable workplaces). 
43 See Sauvant, supra note 37, at fn. 21 (stating that between 1976 and 1985 ne-
gotiations at UNCTAD on the Draft International Code of Conduct on the Trans-
fer of Technology were not completed). 
44 See U.N. Economic and Social Council, Draft International Agreement on Il-
licit Payments, (1991) (outlining a brief history and the text of the Draft Interna-
tional Agreement on Illicit Payments). 
45 See David Weissbrodt & Maria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard To Human 
Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 903-905 (2003) (providing an overview of the history 
of the development of the U.N. Norms). 
46 See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) (providing this 
code of conduct for MNCs).  
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business, 47 they were not adopted by the U.N.48 
While the U.N. Commission of Human Rights was reluctant to 
adopt the draft U.N. Norms, it continued to confirm the im-
portance of business and human rights issues.49  Indeed, alongside 
the U.N. Norms drafting process, in a separate venue, the then 
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan created the Global Compact, a 
U.N. sponsored policy initiative that advocated good corporate 
practices in several areas, including human rights.50  The Global 
Compact was applauded by businesses, but derided by its critics 
for its non-binding nature and lack of any monitoring or enforce-
ment mechanisms.51  Given the problems with the U.N. Draft 
Norms and the shortcomings of the Global Compact, the U.N. con-
tinued to explore “what the international community expects of 
business when it comes to human rights.”52  Accordingly, it re-
                                                 
47 See RADU MARES, Business and Human Rights After Ruggie: Foundations, the 
Art of Simplification and the Imperative of Cumulative Progress in THE U.N. GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION, 
10 (2012) (commenting on feelings that business typically dislikes binding regula-
tions until it sees their necessity or inevitability); Sean Murphy, Taking Multina-
tional Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 389, 
408 (2005) (“[m]any criticisms have been leveled against such codes, suggesting 
that, over the long term, [such codes] may not survive in their present form”). 
48 See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/DEC/2004/116 (Apr. 20, 2004) (providing the final 
norms adopted by the U.N.). 
49 See id. 
50 See United Nations, Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Hu-
man Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to World Economic Forum in Da-
vos, Switzerland, U.N. Doc SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999) (discussing the need en-
gage business to further human rights goals).  See also Andreas Rasche, “A 
Necessary Supplement”: What the United Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not, 48 BUS. 
& SOC’Y 511 (2009) (providing an overview of the Global Compact). 
51 See, e.g., Surya Deva, Global Compact: A Critique of the U.N.’s “Public-Private” 
Partnership for Promoting Corporate Citizenship, 34 Syracuse J. of INT’L. L & COM. 107 
(2006) (arguing that the Global Compact principles are both general and vague, 
and there are risks of lack of commitment); Betty King, The UN Global Compact: 
Responsibility for Human Rights, Labor Relations, and the Environment in Developing 
Nations, 34 Cornell Int’l L. J. 481, 482 (2001) (noting that the U.N., while encourag-
ing good practices, does not endorse companies that participate); Jean-Philippe 
Thérien & Vincent Pouliot, The Global Compact: Shifting the Politics of International 
Development?, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 55, 70 (2006) (“[A]lthough the Global 
Compact aims for openness and dialogue, the stakeholders inside and outside the 
Compact remain on very different wavelengths.”). 
52 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report Of The United Nations High 
Commissioner On Human Rights On The Responsibilities Of Transnational Corporations 
And Related Business Enterprises With Regard To Human Rights, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. 
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quested the U.N. Secretary General to appoint a Special Repre-
sentative to, among other issues, clarify standards of MNC respon-
sibility and accountability in relation to human rights.53  
In a report entitled, The “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework,54 the U.N. Special Representative John Ruggie advo-
cated that responsibility for business and human rights issues rest-
ed on three different differentiated but complementary pillars.  
These included:  the state duty to protect against human rights 
abuses by third parties, including business, through policies, regu-
lations, and adjudication;55 the corporate responsibility to respect 
human rights by way of a due diligence process that enables cor-
porations to discern, prevent and address adverse human rights 
impacts;56 and, finally, the need for more effective access by victims 
to remedies, both judicial and non-judicial in nature.57  
 
After the Framework was welcomed by the Human Rights 
Council, Ruggie elaborated upon the Framework’s three pillars in a 
second report.  In “The Guiding Principles on Business and Hu-
man Rights,” he provided detailed steps by which the Framework 
could be implemented.58   
The Guiding Principles provided a unique approach to ad-
dressing the business and human rights problem.  It advocated a 
“smart mix” of voluntary and mandatory initiatives,59 which were 
                                                                                                               
E/CN.4/2005/91 (Feb. 15, 2005).  
53 See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, Human Rights Council Res. 2005/69, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (Apr. 20, 2005) (detailing this request). 
54 U.N. Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights  - Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, John Ruggie, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (including the full 
text of the U.N. Special Representative report). 
55 See id. at ¶ 43 (“The human rights treaty bodies can play an important role 
in making recommendations to States on implementing their obligations to pro-
tect rights vis-à-vis corporate activities.”). 
56 See id. at ¶¶  51-81 (including a table outlining business impacts on human 
rights). 
57 See id. at ¶ 91 (“States should strengthen judicial capacity to hear com-
plaints and enforce remedies against all corporations operating or based in their 
territory, while also protecting against frivolous claims.”).  
58 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 
HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) (providing a guide to the Guiding Principles).  
59 See JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
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designed to strengthen human rights in a pragmatic matter where 
change would be created “where it matters most—in the daily lives 
of people.”60   
For critics, however, the Guiding Principles were an insuffi-
cient response to the business and human rights problem.  For 
some, the Guiding Principles were seen as having failed to propose 
enforceable accountability mechanisms, choosing to leave this with 
domestic governments instead.61  For others, problems with the 
Guiding Principles lay in imposing only negative responsibilities 
on corporations for human rights.62  Critics argued that the failure 
to impose positive human rights obligations on corporations re-
duced societal expectations of businesses.63  Still others found fault 
with the lack of specificity of the human rights responsibilities of 
businesses in the Guiding Principles, and in their failure to de-
mand that states reduce obstacles to access effective remedies.64  
                                                                                                               
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, xxiii (2013) (“…to devise a smart mix of reinforcing policy 
measures that are capable over time of generating cumulative change and achiev-
ing large-scale success—including in the law”).  
60 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Interim report of the Special Representa-
tive of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises, ¶81, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006).  
61 See Florian Wettstein, Normativity, Ethics, and the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: A Critical Assessment, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 162, 166 (2015) 
(commenting that the Guiding Principles assert human rights for all companies 
irrespective of consent to be bound); Christopher Avery, The Development of Argu-
ments for the Accountability of Corporations for Human Rights Abuse in CARRIE BOOTH 
WALLING & SUSAN WALTZ (EDS.), HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM PRACTICE TO POLICY : 
PROCEEDINGS OF A RESEARCH WORKSHOP - GERALD R. FORD SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, 8 (2010)  
Ruggie’s framework proclaims that the state’s duty is to protect, when neither 
the home nor host state has an incentive to protect it will be challenging to secure 
full respect for this duty.  Not only do the home and host governments not have 
an interest in regulating, it is often the reverse–they have an interest in not regu-
lating. 
See generally Surya Deva & David Bilchitz, The Human Rights Obligations Of 
Business: A Critical Framework For The Future in, SURYA DEVA & DAVID BILCHITZ 
(EDS.) HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESS: BEYOND THE CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT?, 14 (2013).  
62 See Deva, supra note 61, at 15.  
63 Id. 
64 Amnesty International et al., Joint Civil Society Statement on the draft Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights, Jan. 2011, at 1, 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Joint_CSO_Statement_on_GPs.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KXT4-8KRH] (“[T]he draft Guiding Principles provide little guidance as 
to what is or is not appropriate and, in so doing, fail to provide concrete recom-
mendations for enhanced protection of human rights against abuse involving 
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Regardless of its shortcomings, today, the Guiding Principles 
delineate the principal obligations of business vis-à-vis human 
rights.  Nevertheless, as non-binding obligations without any mon-
itoring or enforcement mechanism, it is difficult to characterize the 
Guiding Principles as encompassing a specialized regime for busi-
ness and human rights akin to the ones that exist for international 
trade, investment, and human rights. 
 
2.2.3.  Promoting Coherence or Specialization? 
 
While most would accept that business and human rights is-
sues require further legalization, whether that hardening of obliga-
tions for corporations should be confined within the BHR move-
ment or in other related areas of international law, remains an 
open question.  Of course, legalizing BHR issues within a special-
ized regime holds an intuitive appeal, in that it allows for a target-
ed development of the law that could focus on the unique prob-
lems BHR issues pose.   
However, confining BHR legalization to a specialized area only 
risks problems of coherence.  In particular, as specialized regimes 
for international business are endowed with such strong institu-
tional frameworks, they have the ability to set international norms 
that can undermine international human rights norms whenever 
the two areas collide.  Notably, international investment law has 
had a number of interactions with human rights issues, which have 
resulted in the human rights issue being viewed through an in-
vestment lens or negated entirely.65  As a result, to further prevent 
international business norms from undermining human rights is-
sues, further legalization of BHR issues should not be confined on-
ly to a specialized regime, but must be prevalent in other areas 
where BHR issues arise, most notably in the area of international 
investment law and in the context of international investment 
agreements. 
 
                                                                                                               
business.”).  
65 See the examples of these interactions in Part III.B., infra. 
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3.  FURTHER LEGALIZING BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 
 
Having determined the importance of legalizing BHR issues in 
not only a specialized regime but also in other areas where BHR is-
sues arise frequently, this Part canvasses the options for further le-
galization.  It begins with the proposed dedicated BHR treaty men-
tioned at the outset of this article before proceeding to discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of concluding such a treaty. 
 
3.1.  Beginning the BHR Treaty Process 
 
In 2013, Ecuador began canvassing the idea that the U.N. con-
sider drafting a BHR treaty, which in many ways echoed the civil 
society critiques of the Guiding Principles.66  This was followed up 
by a formal resolution, made to the Human Rights Council, in con-
junction with Bolivia, Cuba, South Africa, and Venezuela, propos-
ing that an open-ended intergovernmental working group be con-
stituted to develop an international legally binding instrument for 
the regulation of MNCs and other business enterprises.67  At ap-
proximately the same time, a second resolution—spearheaded by 
Norway—also called for the development of a BHR treaty, but un-
like the Ecuadorian resolution, the Norwegian resolution did not 
focus only on the BHR treaty.  Instead, it suggested that states con-
tinue to promote and build on the Guiding Principles while also 
launching an inclusive and consultative process to explore legal 
and practical measures to improve access to remedies for corpo-
rate-related abuse victims, including an exploration of the benefits 
and limitations of a legally binding instrument.68   
                                                 
66 Statement on behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24rd Session of the 
Human Rights Council, Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Sep. 2013), 
https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/
statement-unhrc-legally-binding.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ5L-R7QP] (including 
Ecuador’s statement to the Human Rights Council). 
67 See Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an international legally binding in-
strument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to 
human rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (June 25, 2014) [hereinafter Ecua-
dor Resolution 26/9] (providing full text of the proposal to develop an interna-
tional legally binding instrument for regulating MNCs). 
68  See Human Rights Council, Human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, ¶8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.1 (June 23, 2014) (“Requests 
the Working Group to launch an inclusive and transparent consultative process 
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From the outset, the Ecuadorian resolution reflected two prob-
lems in its suggested approach.  First, the resolution made an ac-
tive effort to move away from the Guiding Principles.  While it did 
reference the Guiding Principles as background, it did not make 
any further reference to them thereafter.69  Instead, its focus was 
only on the primary responsibility of states to protect and promote 
human rights, and consequently the need for a binding BHR treaty.  
However, by reiterating the role of the state and focusing only on a 
treaty—a governance method open only to states—the Ecuadorian 
resolution made clear that the three-pillared approach of the Guid-
ing Principles fell short of their preferred mechanism of a reinvig-
orated state.  This reassertion of the dominance of the state caused 
one commentator to argue that this approach may be akin to an at-
tack on capitalist democracies and the former imperial powers, 
who through the domination of their MNCs, are viewed as “in-
struments of home state policies” and therefore under home state 
control.70  
A second problem was that the Ecuadorian resolution ad-
dressed only the human rights adversities of transnational corpora-
tions, specifically excluding domestic businesses registered under 
national law.71  However, businesses, whether domestic or transna-
tional in nature, can cause human rights problems.  As Ruggie il-
lustrates, in the case of the Rana Plaza disaster, the Ecuadorian res-
olution would have covered the international businesses 
purchasing the garments from the factories, but not the local facto-
ries producing the garments.72   
                                                                                                               
with States in 2015, open to other relevant stakeholders, to explore and facilitate 
the sharing of legal and practical measures to improve access to remedy, judicial 
and non-judicial, for victims of business-related abuses….”). 
69 Id. at introduction (“Stressing that the obligation and primary responsibil-
ity to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms lie with the 
State”). 
70 Larry Catá Backer, Moving Forward The U.N. Guiding Principles For Business 
And Human Rights: Between Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and 
The Treaty Law That Might Bind Them All, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 457, 529-530 
(2015). 
71  Ecuador Resolution 26/9, supra note 67, at n.1 (“Other business enterpris-
es’ denotes all business enterprises that have a transnational character in their op-
erational activities, and does not apply to local businesses registered in terms of 
relevant domestic law.”). 
72  John G. Ruggie, The Past as Prologue? A Moment of Truth for UN Business 
and Human Rights Treaty, 1 (2014), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/CSRI/Treaty_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQW6-LG4D] (“It then goes on 
to define ‘other business enterprises’ in a way that is intended to exclude national 
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The NGO EarthRights International was even more vocal in its 
identification with this aspect of the Ecuadorian resolution.  As 
they noted: “How can we tell [victims of corporate human rights 
abuse] that the protections of international law don’t apply to them 
simply because the corporation that’s polluting their environment 
is a [domestic] company instead of [an international company]?”73 
The problematic nature of the Ecuadorian resolution became 
apparent during its adoption at the Human Rights Council.  It was 
adopted with 20 votes in favor, 14 against, and 13 abstentions.74  
Conversely, the Norwegian resolution, which emphasized a more 
general exploration of further avenues for legalization, was adopt-
ed by consensus.75   
 
3.2.  Arguments For and Against a Specialized BHR Treaty 
 
Despite the Ecuadorian resolution for a BHR treaty having 
some shortcomings and polarizing the business and human rights 
debate, these downfalls do not necessarily suggest that a BHR 
Treaty is per se not needed.  Indeed, while the Ecuadorian vision 
for a BHR Treaty may be flawed, there are some strong arguments 
supporting the elaboration of a BHR Treaty. 
 
 
                                                                                                               
companies, so that the new legal framework would apply only to transnational 
corporations.”). 
73  Jonathan Kaufman, UN's Historic Business and Human Rights Treaty Resolu-
tion Falls Short in Providing Relief for Victims, EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, June 27, 
2014, https://www.earthrights.org/media/uns-historic-business-and-human-
rights-treaty-resolution-falls-short-providing-relief-victims 
[https://perma.cc/X2LK-QK5V].  
74  The Ecuadorian Resolution was adopted on June 26, 2014.  See Human 
Rights Council, Report of the Human Rights Council on its Twenty-Sixth Session, ¶¶ 
178-183, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/2 (Dec. 11, 2014) (including the voting record for 
the resolution). 
75  The Norwegian resolution was adopted without a vote on June 27, 2014.  
See Human Rights Council, 26/22 Human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22 (July 15, 2014) 
(“…recognizing that it may be further considered whether relevant legal frame-
works would provide more effective avenues of remedy for affected individuals 
and communities”). 
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3.2.1. The Need for a Specialized BHR Treaty 
 
One of the primary arguments in favor of a BHR treaty is that 
an international mechanism can be used to cover the governance 
gaps that currently exist.  Indeed, the failure of the Guiding Princi-
ples to cover the accountability of corporations that operate in 
states without adequate human rights regulation or remedies to 
address human rights abuses, or that are unwilling to enforce these 
regulations or provide access to remedies, has been one of the most 
important critiques of the Guiding Principles.  Conversely, the ex-
istence of an internationally legally binding instrument could en-
sure that corporations that fail to follow national laws or operate in 
states without adequate laws or remedial mechanisms, can be more 
easily held accountable for human rights-related abuses. 
A second argument for a BHR treaty would be to use it as a 
central source within which the responsibilities of corporations 
could be outlined.  This could be used to clarify and help corpora-
tions and stakeholders understand the precise nature of the re-
sponsibilities imposed upon corporations.  Alternatively, it could 
act as a template for states when they are enacting their own laws 
on corporate responsibility for human rights at the national level.76  
Similarly, a BHR treaty could be used to set international standards 
for corporate responsibilities for human rights.77  In this way, the 
treaty could further norm development in this area, both at the in-
ternational and at the national level.78 
                                                 
76 See SURYA DEVA, REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: 
HUMANIZING BUSINESS, 215-216 (2012) (arguing that once “corporate human rights 
responsibilities are agreed upon at [an] international level, they would have to be 
given a more precise meaning at [a] national level.”); Chip Pitts, The World Needs A 
Treaty On Business And Human Rights, OPEN DEMOCRACY, May 26, 2014, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights-blog/chip-pitts/world-
needs-treaty-on-business-and-human-rights [https://perma.cc/J8ND-RLRJ] (stat-
ing that the treaties produce necessary international regulatory framework to en-
sure that the pursuit of commercial activity does not conflict with and enhances 
fundamental human dignity and development). 
77 See David Bilchitz, The Necessity for a Business and Human Rights Treaty, 11 
(Nov. 30, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2562760 
[https://perma.cc/NAX4-8XC8] (“One of the prime functions that a treaty could 
perform would be to provide such a mechanism for the development of interna-
tional standards surrounding business and human rights.”). 
78 See Bilchitz, supra note 77, at 12 (arguing that treaties and international 
human rights law could also help at a national level); Pitts, supra note 76 (stating 
that these treaties help create “new customary global law”).  
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Third, proponents view a BHR treaty as serving as a mecha-
nism for transforming the Guiding Principles, or principles derived 
from them—thought of as ‘soft’ law—into binding law.79  By 
strengthening regulatory efforts in this area into ‘hard’ law,  corpo-
rate accountability will be increased as corporations are thought 
more likely to comply with ‘hard’ rather than ‘soft’ human rights 
obligations.80  Moreover, by codifying business and human rights 
obligations, the importance of business-related human rights obli-
gations vis-à-vis other business norms are reinforced.  This can be 
particularly cogent in areas where business and human rights is-
sues clash—such as in international trade or investment law—and 
business norms are codified while human rights obligations re-
main ‘soft’ law.81 
BHR treaty proponents further see the treaty as an opportunity 
to ‘level the playing field’ because it ensures that all corporations 
must adhere to the same set of human rights standards, and be-
cause it prevents states from adopting lower levels of human rights 
protection as a method of attracting investment.82  It can also act as 
a tool to minimize risk and to enhance corporate reputation.83  A 
                                                 
79 See Bilchitz, supra note 77, at 24 (noting that a soft instrument such as the 
Guiding Principles can indeed be a precursor to stronger, more binding interna-
tional law in this field). 
80 See, e.g., Pitts, supra note 76 (“…as a former Chief Legal Officer charged 
with ensuring corporate compliance with standards, I can assure you that execu-
tives are more inclined to comply with hard law (like a treaty).”). 
81 See Barnali Choudhury et al., A Call for a WTO Ministerial Decision on Trade 
and Human Rights in THOMAS COTTIER & PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS (EDS), THE 
PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: FROM FRAGMENTATION TO 
COHERENCE, 323, 330 (2011) (providing an overview of human rights clashes with 
WTO Law); Barnali Choudhury, Democratic Implications Arising from the Intersec-
tion of Investment Arbitration and Human Rights, 46 ALTA. L. REV. 983 (2009) (outlin-
ing human rights clashes with international investment law).  See also Third World 
Network, U.N. body to elaborate treaty on TNCs/human rights holds first session, Glob-
al Policy Forum, July 8, 2015, https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/
content/article/270-general/52786-un-body-to-elaborate-treaty-on-tncshuman-
rights-holds-first-session.html [https://perma.cc/6SZX-DH3U] (“While TNCs are 
granted rights through hard law instruments, such as bilateral investment treaties 
and investment rules in free trade agreements, and have access to a system of in-
vestor-State dispute settlement, there are no hard law instruments that address 
the obligations of corporations to respect human rights.”). 
82 See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 4, at 34 (commenting 
on the unlevel playing field created by the differences between national jurisdic-
tions); Pitts, supra note 76 (“Without a treaty, national courts make erroneous de-
cisions on international law….”). 
83 See Pitts, supra note 76 (arguing a treaty is in the interest of business to 
show compliance given that a few violators can create bad reputations every-
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BHR treaty further enables small states to have a voice in the gov-
ernance of corporations, a voice that some believe was marginal-
ized in the scope of drafting the Guiding Principles.84 
More importantly, however, a BHR treaty is thought to greatly 
increase access to effective remedies to human rights victims.85  A 
treaty could facilitate international cooperation on remedies in 
numerous areas from investigations, to adjudication, to executions 
of judicial decisions.86  It could also create supervisory or monitor-
ing bodies to oversee states unwilling or unable to enforce human 
rights standards on corporations in their jurisdiction, thereby en-
suring that regardless of location, victims would have access to a 
remedy.87  
                                                                                                               
where). 
84 See Bonita Meyersfeld, To Bind or Not to Bind (Apr. 2014), https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/a_new_treaty.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F4KP-T6R3] (arguing, among other things, for a greater role 
for the Global South in the international treaty process); Larry Catá Backer, Essay: 
Considering a Treaty on Corporations and Human Rights: Mostly Failures But With a 
Glimmer of Success, Coalition for Peace & Ethics, Working Paper No. 6/1, Aug. 
2015, 3-4, http://www.thecpe.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Considering-a-
Treaty-on-Corporations-and-Human-RightsV3.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMA5-
VS6T] (“The treaty process is necessary as a crucial means by which small and de-
veloping states may have their voices heard, may preserve even a semblance of 
their sovereignty.”). 
85 See, e.g., Surya Deva, Regulatory initiatives on business & human rights: Where 
are the victims?, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, June, 2015, 
https://business-humanrights.org/en/regulatory-initiatives-on-business-human-
rights-where-are-the-victims [https://perma.cc/UBC8-RU3G] (“We need a legal-
ly binding international instrument not for the sake of it, but to fill governance 
gaps left by the existing regulatory initiatives.”); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF 
JURISTS, supra note 4, at 15.  See also Doug Cassel & Anita Ramasastry, Anatomy of a 
business and human rights treaty?, INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS at 2 
(June 25, 2015) (“The lack of access to an effective remedy has led a global coali-
tion of NGOs to advocate for a new, general treaty on business and human 
rights.”). 
86 See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 4, at 15 (“Availability 
and effectiveness of remedies to provide redress to those who suffer harm….”).  
See also Nicolás Carrillo Santarelli & Jernej Letnar Černič, Summary of the Workshop 
on a Treaty on Business & Human Rights, 9 (June 26, 2015), https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Madridworkshop-
summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7DR-6TND] (noting that greater cooperation is 
possible). 
87 Many proponents of the BHR treaty view monitoring or supervisory action 
as an important aspect of the treaty.  See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF 
JURISTS, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing the details of a redress system for victims of 
human rights violations); DEVA, supra note 76, at 219 (arguing that international 
instructions should be utilized to exert pressure on states to regulate the conduct 
of companies more vigorously). 
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3.2.2.  Impediments to a Specialized BHR Treaty 
 
Despite this array of strong arguments in favor of a BHR treaty, 
the debate over the treaty continues to gain strength and the argu-
ments against a treaty continue to proliferate.  One of the most vo-
cal opponents to the elaboration of a legally binding instrument in 
this area is John Ruggie, the author of the Guiding Principles him-
self.  Ruggie is not necessarily against the idea of a BHR treaty; he 
favors the idea of a legally binding instrument on business in-
volvement in gross human rights abuses.88  Yet he cautions against 
the elaboration of a BHR treaty, because of the desire of treaty pro-
ponents to create an “overarching international legal framework” 
for MNC conduct under international human rights law, and be-
cause of the vast spectrum of areas contained in the field of busi-
ness and human rights, which are too broad and too complex to be 
detailed comprehensively in one document.89 
Ruggie is not alone in his concern over the scope of a BHR trea-
ty.  As one commentator has questioned: just how much can one 
treaty address?90  Businesses can affect a wide range of internation-
al human rights, including civil and political rights; economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights; labor rights; and environmental rights.91  
While the Ecuadorian resolution initially left the scope of covered 
human rights in the treaty unclear, more recently, the small num-
                                                 
88 See John Ruggie, Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights 
Treaty Sponsors, INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND BUSINESS (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-business.html 
[https://perma.cc/TSH7-C7YP] (highlighting the difficulties of having successful 
negotiations to make a BHS treaty such as a weak political mandate, the proposed 
treaty’s unworkable scope and scale, and the record of implementation of U.N. 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)). 
89 See id. at 7 (explaining that “neither the international political or legal or-
der is capable of achieving that [overarching international legal framework] in 
practice”). 
90 Shane Darcy, ‘Key Issues In The Debate On A Binding Business And Human 
Rights Instrument, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRELAND (Apr. 13, 2015), available 
at https://businesshumanrightsireland.wordpress.com/2015/04/13/key-issues-
in-the-debate-on-a-binding-business-and-human-rights-instrument/ 
[https://perma.cc/RZE7-5FJM]. 
91 For a good overview of the range of human rights that businesses can im-
pact, see Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, ¶ 2, A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 (May 23, 2008) (listing the civil, political, eco-
nomic, and cultural rights and labor rights that are impacted by transnational 
corporations). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
  
450 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
ber of states participating in the BHR treaty-drafting process de-
clared that the full catalogue of human rights should be included 
within the treaty.92  The problem with including such a large cata-
logue of human rights in the treaty is that there is a risk that the 
rights may have to be attenuated in order to gain state approval.93  
A treaty with the full spectrum of rights would also make the BHR 
treaty rather similar to the UN Norms, which contained references 
to over 50 different human rights, but was considered overly broad 
and was objected to by businesses.94 
Another common complaint about the BHR treaty is that it ap-
pears to be moving away from the Guiding Principles, rather than 
building upon it.95  Referring to the adoption of the Ecuador initia-
tive as a “genuine setback” that broke the unanimous consensus on 
business and human rights, the International Organization of Em-
ployers stated that moving ahead with the BHR treaty is a retreat 
to past practices, which have failed in the past and which “are di-
ametrically opposed to the goal of quickly advancing the imple-
mentation of these Guiding Principles.”96  Indeed, some have ex-
                                                 
92 UN Treaty on Business & Human Rights Negotiations Day 2: EU Disengage-
ment & Lack of Consensus on Scope, EUROPEAN COALITION FOR CORPORATE JUSTICE, at 
4 (July 8, 2015), http://www.corporatejustice.org/UN-Treaty-on-Business-
Human-Rights-negotiations-Day-2-EU-disengagement-Lack-of.html?lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/MWP4-YZYJ] (“While some voices were raised in the past year 
for limiting the binding instrument to gross violations, the room unanimously 
supported that the full catalogue of human rights—all of which subjectable to 
corporate violations—should be included.”). 
93 See Chris Esdaile, A step forward? A sceptical view on the need for a new busi-
ness and human rights treaty, OPEN DEMOCRACY (May 26, 2014), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights-blog/chris-esdaile/step-
forward-sceptical-view-on-need-for-new-business-and-human-r 
[https://perma.cc/AZ6G-EG5H] (arguing that accountability is needed, not a 
weak treaty).  
94 See Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 309, 319 (2004) (“This instrument, however, does not seem to be as 
influential as any of its other counterparts; business organizations have objected 
to its somewhat unrealistically broad scope and binding references”); Esdaile, su-
pra note 93, at 2 (“It seems highly unlikely that companies will willingly accept 
binding obligations in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights (despite 
them being included in the GPs)….”).  
95  See, e.g., Backer, supra note 70, at 527-28 (arguing that the core of the Ec-
uador initiative “strategy was a reconceptualization of the GPs, rejecting the GP 
project as an objective, asserting that they were merely a gateway to a more per-
manent and quite distinct objective”).  
96  See INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF EMPLOYERS, supra note 8 (explaining 
how the vote at the UN Human Rights Council on the Ecuador Initiative repre-
sents a setback to the efforts of improving the human rights situation in business).  
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pressed concern that progressing with a treaty may distract from 
full implementation of the Guiding Principles, which remain in 
their infancy and have not been able to be fully realized by many 
states.97 
A third concern about the BHR treaty is the apparent prefer-
ence for the treaty as a form.  The deep interest in a treaty appears, 
in part, because it is seen as being able to close the governance 
gaps that the Guiding Principles did not address.  Nevertheless, 
simply concluding a treaty does not necessarily mean that states 
will comply with it.  In fact, several studies have found that the rat-
ification of a human rights treaty may not have any impact, or only 
a marginal impact on a state’s respect for human rights.98  Con-
versely, a voluntary measure, such as the Guiding Principles, can 
influence respect for human rights, even without being in the form 
of a treaty.99  A preference for a treaty over other initiatives can al-
                                                 
97  See International Justice Resource Centre, In Controversial Landmark Resolu-
tion, Human Rights Council Takes First Step Toward Treaty On Transnational Corpora-
tions’ Human Rights Obligations (July 15, 2014), http://www.ijrcenter.org/
2014/07/15/in-controversial-landmark-resolution-human-rights-council-takes-
first-step-toward-treaty-on-transnational-corporations-human-rights-obligations/ 
[https://perma.cc/9ZBH-38W4] (establishing that the call for the elaboration of a 
BHS treaty distracts from full implementation of the Guiding Principles); Michael 
Kourabas, Is a Binding Treaty the Way Forward for Business and Human Rights?, 
TRIPLE PUNDIT at 2 (July 14, 2015), http://www.triplepundit.com/2015/07/
binding-treaty-way-forward-business-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/2FJD-
26ZC] (noting that some feel that a treaty would “undermine the young UNGPs”). 
98 See the studies cited in Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Trea-
ties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925, 950-51 (2005) 
(providing evidence that where there is an absence of civil society or democracy, 
“human rights treaty ratification often makes no difference and can even make 
things worse”).  See also Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human 
Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 588 (2007) (explaining how the effectiveness 
of human right treaties depends on domestic legal enforcement). 
99  The Guiding Principles have influenced several international and national 
bodies including the Global Compact, the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, the OECD’s Common Approaches for Export Credit Agencies, the 
ISO 26000 standard on social performance, the IFC’s Sustainability Principles and 
Performance Standards in addition to EU and national law and policy.  See SHIFT, 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2015), http://
www.shiftproject.org/page/un-guiding-principles-business-and-human-rights 
[https://perma.cc/T34N-C5JM] (explaining that the Guiding Principles “are the 
authoritative global standard on business and human rights, unanimously en-
dorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011”);  Karin Buhmann, Business and 
Human Rights: Understanding the UN Guiding Principles from the Perspective of 
Transnational Business Governance Interactions, DIGITAL COMMONS (2014), 
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&con
text=olsrps [https://perma.cc/226M-V7Q3] (showing how “the Guiding Princi-
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so be seen as a preference for state regulation—and an effort to el-
evate states as the supreme form of governance—over other forms 
of regulation, including self-governance, as offered in the Guiding 
Principles, which encourages corporations to take ownership of 
their actions.100 
Finally, critics argue that a BHR treaty would be of limited val-
ue because states that are home to some of the world’s largest 
MNCs are not supportive of the treaty.  This critique stems from 
the number and identity of states that opposed Ecuador’s resolu-
tion at the time of its adoption by the Human Rights Council.  
States opposing Ecuador’s resolution included, among others, the 
U.S., the U.K., France, Italy, and Japan.101  Coincidentally, of the 10 
largest transnational companies in the world, two are headquar-
tered in the U.S., two in France, three in the U.K., one in Japan, and 
one in Italy.102  Conversely, support for the resolution stemmed 
mainly from states that are recipients of MNC activity.103 
While there is some support for the expressive function of 
law,104 a BHR treaty that would not be ratified by states that are 
                                                                                                               
ples have already had significant influence on several other public and private 
business governance instruments, including the Global Compact, OECD’s Guide-
lines for Multinational Enterprises, ISO 26000 as well as EU and national law and 
policy”). 
100  See Backer, supra note 70, at 532 (arguing that the ideological foundations 
of the treaty movement are meant “to manage, if not eliminate the private sector, 
or at least to subordinate it to the command of the state”). 
101  The full list of states that opposed the resolution were: Austria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Montenegro, South Ko-
rea, Romania, Macedonia, UK, and the US.  See UN Human Rights Council Sessions, 
BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. at 2 (Jun. 2014), http://business-humanrights.org/en/
binding-treaty/un-human-rights-council-sessions [https://perma.cc/4PRP-G3C5] 
(observing that on June 26th, 2014, the UN Human Rights Council adopted Ecua-
dor and South Africa’s resolution with 20 votes in favor, 14 votes against, and 13 
abstentions). 
102 See The Economist Online, Biggest Transnational Companies, THE 
ECONOMIST, July 10, 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/
2012/07/focus-1 [https://perma.cc/5WNJ-CMAD]  (showing that the TNCs in-
clude General Electric (US), Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands/UK), BP (UK), Exxon 
Mobil (US), Toyota (Japan), Total (France), GDF Suez (France), Vodafone (UK), 
Enel (Italy)). 
103 The resolution was supported by Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, 
Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mo-
rocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, South Africa, Venezuela, and Vi-
etnam.  See supra note 101 (listing the votes in favor of the resolution). 
104  See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2051 (1996) (“There can be no doubt that law, like action in general, has an 
expressive function.  Some people do what they do mostly because of the state-
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home to the world’s largest MNCs could be of limited value.  
There is a risk that MNCs headquartered in the non-ratifying states 
would cease operations in states that did ratify the BHR treaty, that 
remedies garnered by human rights victims would not be recog-
nized in non-party states, or that the actions of the world’s most 
powerful MNCs would not be covered under the BHR treaty.  Fail-
ing to garner global support for the BHR treaty could not only per-
petuate the existing governance gaps, but it could resign the BHR 
treaty to the same fate as the International Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Rights of All Migrant workers and Their Families,105 which 
after 25 years has only been ratified by 48 states, most of which are 
migrant-sending States.106 
The difficulties with concluding a global treaty on business and 
human rights are not a sufficient reason not to pursue a treaty 
route in this field.  Addressing the existing governance gaps; elab-
orating business responsibilities—particularly as a counterbalance 
to business rights which seem to be well delineated in treaties; 
providing victims with easier access to remedies and leveling the 
playing field, are cogent reasons that support the argument for a 
BHR treaty.  At the same time, the complexity of cataloguing the 
full range of human rights as well as the unfavorable political cli-
mate in which the treaty is clearly mired, suggests that a BHR trea-
ty still faces a long road ahead.  Moreover, given the presence of 
Guiding Principles and their apparent positive influences in sever-
al areas, the answer to whether a BHR treaty is needed is, likely, 
“not now.” 
 
4.  LOOKING BEYOND A BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
  
Despite the climate not being favorable to moving forward 
with a BHR treaty, further legalization is necessary to continue to 
evolve the business and human rights agenda.107  One approach to 
                                                                                                               
ment the act makes; the same is true for those who seek changes in law.”). 
105  United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990), (en-
tered into force July 1, 2003). 
106 See UN Treaty Collection, International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant workers and their Families (providing the full list of countries 
that have ratified the treaty). 
107  See John G. Ruggie, Remarks Made At The Annual Harry LeRoy Jones 
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doing so is to turn to international investment agreements (IIAs).  
Since these agreements already provide a defined role for corpora-
tions and have previously implicated BHR issues, including the 
BHR agenda, within their ambit seems like a natural fit.  More im-
portantly, IIAs have the potential to meet several of the proposed 
BHR treaty’s goals while assuaging some of the concerns of the 
treaty opponents. 
 
4.1.  The Background to International Investment Agreements 
 
International investment agreements are bilateral, preferential 
or regional treaties—including free trade agreements (FTAs)—
concluded by two or more states, to govern foreign investment in 
the contracting states.108  There are now well over 3,200 of these 
agreements in the world, covering global foreign direct investment 
inflows of well over $1.45 trillion.109 
States that are parties to IIAs are required to protect and pro-
mote foreign investment.110  IIAs are therefore designed to shield 
foreign investors and their investments from state interference.111  
                                                                                                               
Award of the Washington Foreign Law Society: International Legalization in 
Business and Human Rights, (June 11, 2014), (transcript available at 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/research/WFLS.pdf) 
[https://perma.cc/U6XB-PFQC]) (arguing that “further legalization is an inevita-
ble and necessary component of future developments.”).  
108  For an overview of international investment agreements, see DOLZER & 
SCHREUER, supra note 30; see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 28 (providing an over-
view of the principles that shape international law of foreign investments as de-
fined by investment treaties and the decisions of international courts). 
109  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, World In-
vestment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: an Action Plan (2014).   
110 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 28, at 188 (“Every bilateral investment treaty 
begins with a declaration as to the purpose of the treaty.  This is usually stated to 
be the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investments.”).  In fact, many 
treaties are entitled Treaty “Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Pro-
tection of Investment.”  E.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 [hereinafter 
U.S.-Arg. Investment Treaty]; Agreement Concerning the Encouragement and Re-
ciprocal Protection of Investments, Burundi-Ger., Sept. 10, 1984, 1517 U.N.T.S. 288, 
293 (1988) (providing examples of the many treaties that use that phrase in their 
titles). 
111 GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 80 – 
81 (2007) (arguing that an investment treaty would do very little if it did not curb 
state conduct). 
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Indeed, because prior to the creation of IIAs, foreign investors were 
often pitted against more powerful states when trying to assert 
their property rights,112 IIAs also work to establish standards of 
protection that states must respect as well as provide a neutral sys-
tem of dispute resolution to resolve investment disputes.113  
The idea behind IIAs is that they are premised on a “grand 
bargain:”  States promise to protect investment and, in return, they 
expect this promise to increase the amount of foreign investment 
they will receive into the state.114  As a result, the treaties have dual 
purposes—to protect foreign investment and, by protecting these 
investments, to attract foreign investment.115  
Unfortunately, the idea of the “grand bargain” premise has 
been somewhat undercut by the numerous studies that question 
whether the conclusion of IIAs increases the amount of foreign in-
vestment116 and by the increasing number of states that act as both 
                                                 
112  For an overview of the historical origins of international investment law, 
see KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, 
ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL 17 – 122 (2013) (discussing the 
international legal developments in investment law beginning over the course of  
the 17th to mid-20th  centuries); see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 28, at 19 – 44 (out-
lining the history of foreign investment law in the colonial and the post-colonial 
period); see also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 39, at 1 – 57 (explaining how 
the origins of international investment law show a continuous pattern of restraint 
and resistance through law). 
113  See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 39, at 65 – 74 (outlining the scope 
and structure of IIAs); see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 28, at 201 – 205, 276 – 305 
(explaining the use of contract-based arbitration in the settlement of investment 
disputes).  
114 See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An 
Evaluation Of Bilateral Investment Treaties And Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L. 
L. J. 67, 77 (2005) (stating that a BIT between a developed and a developing coun-
try is founded on a grand bargain: a promise of protection of capital in return for 
the prospect of more capital in the future). 
115 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, The Role of International 
Investment Agreements in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment to Developing 
Countries (2009) (reviewing a number of econometric studies that explore the im-
pact of IIAs on investment inflows).  For this reason, creating “favourable condi-
tions for investment” is typically the first listed object or purpose of IIAs.  See e.g., 
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-India, Mar. 14, 
1994, 34 I.L.M. 935 (“Desiring to create conditions favorable for fostering greater 
investment by investors…”); see also Agreement Between the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China and the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union on the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, China- Belg./Lux., June 4, 
1984,  UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty
File/340 (“Desiring to develop economic cooperation…”). 
116  E.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign 
Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 434 – 
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capital importers and exporters.117  Modern IIAs therefore reflect 
state interest in concluding these treaties to both grant protection 
to their investors when acting abroad, as well as attract foreign in-
vestment into their territory in order to foster their country’s eco-
nomic development.118 
Despite the ‘spaghetti bowl’119 phenomenon of IIAs, with trea-
ties often bearing inconsistent or overlapping provisions, IIAs tend 
to bear a number of similar features.  Most treaties begin with a 
preamble that references the contexts within which the treaty is be-
ing concluded.  Preambular language generally includes references 
to desiring the promotion of “greater economic cooperation” be-
tween the contracting states,120 creating “favorable conditions” for 
investment,121 and recognizing that a favorable treatment of in-
vestment will stimulate economic development or the prosperity of 
                                                                                                               
39 (2011) (explaining how BITs at best “spur investment only irregularly, incon-
sistently, and with generally unassuming impact”); see also Mary Hallward‐
Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only A 
Bit…And They Could Bite (World Bank, Policy Research, Working Paper No. WPS 
3121, 2003) (“Analyzing twenty years of bilateral FDI flows from the OECD to de-
veloping countries finds little evidence that BITs have stimulated additional in-
vestment.”).  There are, however, conflicting views on the ability of IIAs to attract 
foreign investment.  For a thorough compilation on both points of view, see KARL 
P. SAUVANT & LISA E. SACHS, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND 
INVESTMENT FLOWS (2009). 
117 See generally U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., South-South Investment Agree-
ments Proliferating, IIA Monitor No. 1, UNCTAD (2005) [hereinafter UNCTAD 
South-South Investment Agreements]. 
118  See, e.g., OECD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: 
MAXIMISING BENEFITS, MINIMISING COSTS 3 (2002) (noting “Foreign direct invest-
ment is … a major catalyst to development”); see also UNCTAD South-South In-
vestment Agreements, supra note 117, at 1 (noting that South-South investment 
agreements represent one aspect of cooperation within the developing world 
aimed at achieving development goals). 
119  Jose E. Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime in LOOKING 
TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 
607, 635 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010). 
120  U.S.-Arg. Investment Treaty, supra note 110, at pmbl.; Agreement be-
tween the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of 
China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-China, 
Sept. 9, 2012, Glob. Affairs Dep’t. of Can. 
121  Agreement Between The Government Of The United Kingdom Of Great 
Britain And Northern Ireland And The Government Of The Republic Of Mozam-
bique For The Promotion And Protection Of Investments, Mozam.-U.K., Mar. 18, 
2004, UNCTAD; Bilateral Investment Treaty between The Government of the 
People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Benin, Benin-
China, Feb. 18, 2004, UNCTAD. 
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the parties.122  It may also contain references to the importance of 
strengthening economic relations, or even bonds of friendship be-
tween the states,123 and may confirm the importance of economic 
or sustainable development.124  After the preamble, some treaties 
outline the objectives of the treaty.125  Thus, some treaties specify 
the treaty’s objective as being the promotion of an “attractive in-
vestment climate”126 whereas others reference objectives such as 
dismantling trade barriers, promoting competition in markets, and 
protecting intellectual property rights.127   
                                                 
122  See, e.g., Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Switz.-Trin. & Tobago, Oct. 26, 2010, Caribbean Elections (“Desiring to intensify 
economic cooperation to the mutual benefit of both States”); see also Treaty Be-
tween the United States of America and The Czech And Slovak Federal Republic 
Concerning The Reciprocal Encouragement And Protection Of Investment, Czech-
U.S., Oct. 22, 1991, U.S. Dep’t. of State (“Desiring to promote greater economic co-
operation between them, with respect to investment by nationals and companies 
of one Party in the territory of the other Party . . . ”); see also Agreement Between 
The Government Of The Republic Of Mauritius And The Government Of The Ar-
ab Republic Of Egypt On The Reciprocal Promotion And Protection of Invest-
ments, Egypt-Mauritius, Aug. 28, 2014, UNCTAD (“Desiring to intensify econom-
ic cooperation to the mutual benefit of both Contracting Parties”). 
123  See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement Between The Swiss Confederation and 
The People’s Republic Of China, China-Switz., July 6, 2013, Swiss Fed. Institute of 
Intellectual Prop. (“Committed to strengthening the bonds of friendship and col-
laboration between the Parties by establishing and deepening close and lasting 
relations.”). 
124  See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its 
Member States and the Republic of Korea, E.U.-S. Kor., Sept. 16, 2010, Official 
Journal of the Eur. Union (“[T]o contribute, by removing barriers to trade and by 
developing an environment conducive to increased investment flows, to the har-
monious development and expansion of world trade”) [hereinafter EU-Korea 
FTA]; see also Agreement Establishing The Free Trade Area between the Caribbean 
Community And The Dominican Republic, CARICOM-Dom. Rep., Aug. 22, 1998, 
Org. of the Americas (“Considering the urgent need to broaden the markets of the 
Parties in order to achieve the economies of scale that will support better levels of 
efficiency, productivity and competitiveness”).  
125  This is more common in free trade agreements and trade and investment 
framework agreements.  Bilateral investment treaties tend not to explicitly define 
objectives. 
126  E.g., Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between the United 
States of America and Myanmar, Myan.-U.S., May 21, 2013, UNCTAD; Invest-
ment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, May 23, 2007, 
TRALAC; Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between the United 
States of America and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, Uru.-U.S., Jan. 25, 2007, 
Official J. of the E.U. 
127  E.g., Free Trade Agreement between People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, China-Costa Rica, Apr. 8, 2011, 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
  
458 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:2 
IIAs then move to define the concept of investment–which is 
generally done widely by specifying that investments include 
“every kind of asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by 
an investor”128–and investors, among other key terms.  The agree-
ments further oblige states to promote or encourage the creation of 
favorable conditions for investments in their territory.129  Some 
agreements also couple promotion or encouragement obligations 
with admission obligations that require states to admit the inves-
tors and investments that they have encouraged, to invest in ac-
cordance with the standards in the agreement.130  These types of 
provisions require states to accord national treatment, or most-
favored nation treatment, in relation to the admission or estab-
lishment of investments.131 
Because investor protection is such a large component of IIAs, a 
significant portion of the treaties are devoted to outlining the sub-
stantive protections accorded to investors and investments.  Gen-
erally, the four most consistently found standards of protection in 
these treaties are national treatment, most-favored nation treat-
                                                                                                               
UNCTAD (stating objectives such as facilitating trade in goods and services, en-
suring the effective protection of intellectual property rights amongst others); see 
also EU-Korea FTA, supra note 124, at art. 1.1(2) (establishing objectives such as to 
liberalize and facilitate trade in goods and services, to promote competition, to 
remove barriers, amongst others). 
128  E.g., Agreement between Japan and Ukraine for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investment, Japan-Ukr., Feb. 5, 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ja-
pan; Agreement Between The Government Of The Republic Of Croatia And The 
Government Of Canada For The Promotion And Protection Of Investments, Can.-
Croat., Feb. 3, 1997, UNCTAD. 
129  E.g., Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Côte d`Ivoire for the Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments, Can.-Côte d’Ivoire, Nov. 30, 2014, Global Affairs Can. [hereinafter Can.- 
Côte d’Ivoire Bilateral Investment Treaty]; Agreement between the Government 
of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myan-
mar for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Isr.-Myan., Oct. 
5, 2014, Dir. of Inv. and Co. Admin. 
130 See, e.g., Can.-Côte d’Ivoire Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 129, at 
art. 3 (“Each Party shall encourage the creation of favourable conditions for in-
vestment in its territory by investors of the other Party and shall admit those in-
vestments in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement”).  See also North 
American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1102, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), 
Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2 [hereinafter NAFTA] (“Each Party shall accord to investors of 
another Party treatment no less favorable than it accords, in like circumstances, to 
its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, man-
agement, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.”). 
131 NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 39, at 134.  
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ment, fair and equitable treatment, and prohibitions on expropria-
tion.132  National treatment prohibits states from discriminating 
against foreign investors by obliging them to treat foreign investors 
and investments no less favorably than domestic investors or in-
vestments.133  Most–favored nation treatment also prohibits dis-
criminatory treatment, but it measures the standard of treatment 
against investors from third party or non-party states.134  Thus, 
states must accord any advantages they accord to investors from 
third party or non–party states to foreign investors from the con-
tracting state.  
Another common standard of treatment found in IIAs is the re-
quirement to accord “fair and equitable treatment.”135  Pursuant to 
this requirement, states must accord investors a minimum stand-
ard of treatment, generally the standard required by international 
law, regardless of the standard of treatment it accords to its domes-
tic investors.136  In many treaties, the requirement is undefined al-
lowing this standard of treatment to receive varying interpreta-
tions.137  Fair and equitable treatment requirements are also often 
coupled with the requirement to accord investors and investments 
“full protection and security.”138 
Finally, IIAs prohibit states from expropriating investments 
                                                 
132 E.g., 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 3–6, 2012, U.S. 
Dep’t of State [hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model BIT].  
133 E.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, Hond.-U.S., July 1, 1995, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-27; NAFTA, supra 
note 130, at art. 1102. 
134  E.g., Agreement between the Swedish Government and the Macedonian 
Government on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Maced.-
Swed., May 7, 1998, UNCTAD; NAFTA, supra note 130, at art. 1103. 
135 E.g., NAFTA, supra note 130, at art. 1105; Treaty between the United 
States of America and the Republic of Turkey Concerning the Reciprocal Encour-
agement and Protection of Investments, Turk.-U.S., Dec. 3, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. 99-
19. 
136 See, e.g., SORNARAJAH, supra note 28, at 204 (discussing the evolution of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard in international law).  There is a debate as to 
whether the minimum standard or an autonomous standard is the standard under 
international law.  See Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNCTAD Series on Issues in In-
ternational Investment Agreements II, UNCTAD, at 21 (2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD 
Fair and Equitable Treatment]. 
137 SORNARAJAH, supra note 28, at 345-46; UNCTAD Fair and Equitable Treat-
ment, supra note 136, at xiii, 1. 
138 See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 39, at 233–34, 306–309 (explaining 
the common IIA practice regarding protection and security obligations). 
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without compensation.139  This prevents states from engaging in 
both physical takings or depriving foreign investors from being 
able to use or control their property.140  
Besides the standards of treatment, IIAs generally include a 
dispute resolution mechanism, known as investment arbitration, 
which is designed to resolve investment-related disputes.141  In-
vestment arbitration permits foreign investors to initiate claims 
against the host state for breaches of the treaty clauses and have 
these disputes resolved by international arbitrators.142  If the state 
is shown to have breached one or more of the treaty provisions, the 
state is obliged to compensate the investor for any losses in-
curred.143 
 
                                                 
139  E.g., Agreement between the Government of The Republic of Guatemala 
And The Government Of The Russian Federation On Promotion And Reciprocal 
Protection Of Investments, Guat.-Russ., Nov. 27, 2013, UNCTAD; Agreement Be-
tween The Republic Of Serbia And The Kingdom Of Morocco On The Reciprocal 
Promotion And Protection Of Investments, Morocco-Serb., June 6, 2013, 
UNCTAD. 
140 See, e.g., UNCTAD, EXPROPRIATION: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II (2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD Expropria-
tion] (examining indirect takings and other core concepts of expropriation); see also 
Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right To Regulate” in International Investment Law 2–
4, OECD, (Working Papers on Int’l Inv., No. 2004/4, 2004) (describing growing 
concerns with indirect expropriation).  
141  E.g., Agreement between Japan and Ukraine for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investment, Japan-Ukr., Feb. 5, 2015, UNCTAD; EU-Korea FTA, supra 
note 124, at art. 14.4 - 14.7; Treaty Between The Government Of The United States 
Of America And The Government Of The Republic Of Rwanda Concerning The 
Encouragement And Reciprocal Protection Of Investment, Rwanda-U.S., Feb. 19, 
2008, U.S. Dep’t. of State. 
142 See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 39, at 70 (explaining how most 
IIAs provide investors the remedy of arbitration when disputes arise from treaty 
breaches); see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 28, at 276–305 (“An arbitration clause is 
included in the contract so as to allow the choice of a neutral forum for the settle-
ment of disputes which arise from the agreement.”).  See generally CAMPBELL 
MCLACHLAN et al., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE 
PRINCIPLES (2008) (tracing the history and functioning of investment arbitration). 
143  See generally BORZU SABAHI, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION IN INVESTOR–
STATE ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 91–102 (2011) (detailing how the 
remedy of compensation works in investment arbitration). 
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4.2.  Parallels between Business and Human Rights and Investment 
and Human Rights Issues 
 
One of the reasons international investment law is ripe for ac-
commodating BHR issues is because, in many ways, the BHR 
agenda parallels many of the issues that have plagued IIAs.  In a 
number of instances, investment arbitrations have highlighted 
ways in which human rights issues can become enmeshed with 
business issues.  Investment disputes have demonstrated that 
business operations can implicate human rights such as the right to 
water,144 the right to health,145 equality rights,146 and indigenous 
rights.147  Indeed, these intersections have been so instrumental at 
times that it has increasingly been accepted that human rights is-
sues should be addressed both within the substance of IIAs as well 
as in the investment arbitration process itself.148 
One very recent illustration of the reflection of the BHR agenda 
in international investment law was the dispute between Philip 
                                                 
144  E.g., SAUR Int’l S.A. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/04/4, Decision on Ju-
risdiction and Liab. (June 6, 2012), Award (May 22, 2014); EDF Int’l S.A. v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/23, Award (June 11, 2012); Biwater Gauff 
(Tanzania) Ltd v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award 
(July 24, 2008); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 
Award (July 14, 2006); Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Re-
public, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (Nov. 10, 2000). 
145  E.g., Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mex. States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003); Methanex Corp. v. United 
States, UNCITRAL, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitration, Final Award (Aug. 3, 
2005). 
146 E.g., Foresti v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No. ARB/(AF)/07/1, 
Award (Aug. 4, 2010). 
147 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. 
Trib., Award (June 8, 2009); Border Timbers Limited v. Republic of Zim., ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/25 (Dec. 20, 2010); Bernhard von Pezold v. Republic of Zim. 
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15 (July 8, 2010). 
148  E.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (providing a systematic analysis of the in-
teraction between international investment law, investment arbitration, and hu-
man rights,); see also Eric De Brabandere, Human Rights Considerations in Interna-
tional Investment Arbitration, in THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
183, 215 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Panos Merkouris eds., 2012) (explaining that it is 
the host state who is obligated to ensure respect for human rights in its territory, 
and that respecting investment agreements can lead to violations of human rights 
obligations, specially in the areas of the rights to water and health). 
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Morris and Uruguay.149  In 2010, tobacco company Philip Morris 
instigated an investment arbitration against the Government of 
Uruguay, arguing that its anti-smoking regulations violate Uru-
guay’s investment treaty obligations.  In particular, Philip Morris 
argued that Uruguay’s regulations requiring that tobacco packag-
ing contain large health warnings of the risks of smoking and 
graphic pictures depicting the negative health effects associated 
with smoking destroy the goodwill associated with the company’s 
trademarks.  It further contended that requirements to sell only a 
single line of tobacco products decrease sales.  Philip Morris 
sought to have Uruguay’s anti-smoking regulations suspended as 
well as damages in the amount of US$25M, although the tribunal 
eventually rejected the company’s claims.150  
Until recently, Philip Morris had been pursuing a similar in-
vestment arbitration against Australia in which it challenged Aus-
tralia’s public health laws relating to anti-smoking.151  However, in 
December 2015 the dispute was dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds.152   
The Philip Morris investment arbitrations against Uruguay and 
Australia have re-emphasized the impact that international in-
vestment law can have on public health issues.  From an interna-
tional investment law perspective, the concern has focused on a 
state’s regulatory abilities to promote public health objectives in 
light of its investment treaty obligations.  For that reason, the new 
Trans-Pacific Partnership specifically allows states to deny investors 
                                                 
149 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/7 (Mar. 25, 2010). 
150  Bob Violino, An Uruguayan Lawsuit With International Implications For Phil-
ip Morris, FORBES (Sep. 22, 2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/
greatspeculations/2014/09/22/an-uruguayan-lawsuit-with-international-
implications-for-philip-morris/ [https://perma.cc/2VDR-7F3U]; Philip Morris 
Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award (Jul. 
8, 2016). 
151 Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. The Commonwealth of Austl., UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2012–12 (2011).  There are 3 documents from 2011, the Notice of 
Claim, Notice of Arbitration and Australia’s response.  We need to know which 
one it is to provide the exact date and include what the document is about as per 
Rule 21.6. 
 152 The award dismissing the case is confidential, but Philip Morris released 
a press release confirming the dismissal.  Press Release, Philip Morris Asia Ltd. 
Comments on Tribunal’s Decision to Decline Jurisdiction in Arbitration Against Com-
monwealth of Australia Over Plain Packaging, PHILIP MORRIS INT’L. (Dec. 17, 2015), 
http://investors.pmi.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=146476&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=
2123843# [https://perma.cc/VLP5-FJG7]. 
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the use of investment arbitration for tobacco control measures in 
order to ensure full regulatory control in this area.153  
Yet, the Philip Morris investment arbitrations also highlight 
many of the complexities prevalent in the BHR community.  Not 
only do the arbitrations represent clear clashes between corporate 
and human rights objectives, but they emphasize the lack of a 
strong governance framework that delineates the obligations of 
corporate responsibility vis-à-vis human rights.  Particularly in the 
case of the Uruguay, they also highlight the power differentials 
that may exist between multinational corporations and states, 
which make it difficult for the latter to protect human rights.  More 
importantly, both arbitrations demonstrate that investment treaty 
obligations may be used by corporations as a tool by which to 
strengthen their power−against even strong states like Australia−to 
weaken state ability to protect human rights. 
 
4.3.   Reconfiguring IIAs to Incorporate BHR Issues 
 
Given the growing recognition of the importance of human 
rights issues in international investment and trade law, this recog-
nition should be used as a base upon which the scope of business’ 
human rights obligations can be built upon and broadened.  Not 
only are there numerous avenues to insert human rights considera-
tions into IIAs, but a reconfigured IIA can also meet many of the 
BHR treaty proponents’ goals. 
 
4.3.1.  Using IIAs to meet BHR treaty goals 
 
A reconfigured IIA has the potential to meet many of the BHR 
treaty proponents’ goals.  For one, a reconfigured IIA can help ad-
dress some of the governance gaps that BHR treaty proponents ar-
gue have been left as a result of the Guiding Principles.  While 
states may be unwilling to enact or enforce corresponding domes-
tic legislation that implements the Guiding Principles, if they be-
come party to an IIA that contains human rights obligations, they 
will be automatically beholden to these obligations in the context 
                                                 
153 Trans-Pacific Partnership, art. 29.5, Nov. 5, 2015, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative. 
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of foreign investment.154  Moreover, to the extent that less powerful 
states are the ones reluctant to implement the Guiding Principles, 
using IIAs to impose human rights obligations on these states may 
be fruitful since there has been a marked interest by the more 
‘powerful’ states in increasing human rights considerations in IIAs 
and they may dominate the IIA negotiation process, particularly 
with ‘weaker’ states.155 
Second, reconfiguring IIAs would meet BHR treaty propo-
nents’ aims for transforming human rights obligations of business 
into binding, or ‘hard,’ law.  As commentators have noted, IIAs 
and investment arbitrations are one of the most prominent sources 
of enforceable hard law for businesses.156  Consequently, inserting 
human rights obligations of business into these treaties ‘hardens’ 
the obligations as well and reinforces their importance alongside 
state obligations to investors.  
Finally, BHR treaty proponents have cited the need for access 
to effective remedies for human rights victims as a reason to enact 
a BHR treaty.  IIAs offer one of the most robust vehicles from 
which an effective remedy can be sought–investment arbitration.  
Unlike many other areas of international law, investment arbitra-
tion provides an easily accessible avenue through which IIA obli-
gations can be enforced and which provides monetary compensa-
tion for failure to abide by those obligations.157  While at present, 
investment arbitration mainly acts as a vehicle by which corpora-
tions and other investors can seek remedies, a reconfigured IIA 
could provide access to remedies for more than just investors. 
                                                 
154  This is because the human rights obligations will be part of the treaty ob-
ligations to which they must adhere. 
155  See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 132; Canada’s 2004 Model For-
eign Investment and Protection Agreement, both of which detail a number of hu-
man rights provisions.  On the uneven bargaining power between states, see Phil-
ip De Man & Jan Wouters, Improving The Framework Of Negotiations On 
International Investment Agreements, 19 (Leuven Ctr. For Glob. Governance Stud., 
Working Paper No. 84, 2012) (“[T]he noted asymmetry in bargaining power be-
tween developed and developing countries is arguably greater in a bilateral set-
ting . . . which might explain why weaker States have signed into heavily one-
sided BITs . . . ”). 
156 E.g., JAN KLABBERS et al., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 215 (2009).  
157  For a good overview of the investment arbitration process, see Barton 
Legum, An Overview of Procedure in an Investment Treaty Arbitration, in 
ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY 
ISSUES 91 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010). 
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4.3.2.  Adopting the BHR Agenda for IIAs 
 
The avenues by which the BHR agenda can be adopted by IIAs 
are numerous.  Human rights observance can be included during 
the initial drafting of the treaties or by revoking an existing treaty 
right before it is set to expire.158  In addition, IIAs can be terminated 
at any time with the consent of all the treaty parties159 and some 
IIAs can also be terminated unilaterally at any time after an initial 
term of the treaty has been completed.160  Termination can, thus, 
provide further opportunities to redraft IIAs to include human 
rights provisions.  Moreover, UNCTAD reports that opportunities 
to revoke IIAs before expiration or to terminate them unilaterally 
at any time are increasing and expects around 1600 treaties to be 
able to be renegotiated by the end of 2018.161  Consequently, the 
time for inserting human rights provisions into IIAs is ripe. 
In fact, there are a number of different avenues by which hu-
man rights provisions can be inserted into IIAs.  These include the 
use of preambles or objectives, substantive obligations, human 
rights chapters and alternative remedies.  
 
Preambles/Objectives 
Preambles referencing BHR issues is one method by which 
human rights considerations by businesses can be inserted into 
IIAs and influence their interpretation.  The importance of pream-
bular language has been underscored in previous investment dis-
putes where investment arbitral tribunals have specifically noted 
the importance of interpreting standards of treatment in IIAs by 
reference to the treaties’ objects and purpose, which is arguably as-
certained from the preamble.162  Consequently, inserting state-
                                                 
158  UNCTAD, International Investment Policymaking In Transition: Challenges 
And Opportunities Of Treaty Renewal IIA, Issues Note No. 4, at 3 (2013) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD International Investment Policymaking In Transition]. 
159 E.g., Vienna Convention Law of Treaties, art. 54(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
160 UNCTAD International Investment Policymaking In Transition, supra note 
158, at 3. 
161 Id. at 4. 
162 See, e.g., Siemens A.G. v. The Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 81 (Aug. 3, 2004) (“The Tribunal shall be guided by the 
purpose of the Treaty as expressed in its title and preamble . . .”).  See also Lauder 
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ments that recognize the importance of human rights, and specifi-
cally corporate responsibility for the protection of human rights, is 
pertinent.   
Preambles of IIAs could include language such as recognition 
of: the importance of corporate social responsibility;163 the need to 
realize investment objectives “without relaxing health, safety and 
environmental measures,”164 the importance of “internationally 
recognized labor rights,”165 the undertakings in the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption,166 and the fact that the protection 
and promotion of investment fosters sustainable development.167  
Furthermore, preambles could acknowledge the importance of 
good corporate governance as well as affirm the need to require 
corporations to observe internationally recognized standards of 
good corporate conduct.168  
Preambles could also be used to signal the context within 
which IIAs are being concluded.  Thus, they could refer to the im-
                                                                                                               
v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶ 292 (Sept. 3, 2001) (defining “fair 
and equitable treatments” by using the treaty as a starting point); Continental Cas. 
Co. v. The Arg. Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 
80 (Feb. 22 2006) (relying on the treaty for the purposes of interpretation); Saluka 
Investments BV v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, ¶ 299 – 300 (Mar. 
17, 2006) (examining the purpose of the treaty). 
163 See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Govern-
ment of Burkina Faso for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Burk. 
Faso, Apr. 20, 2015, Glob. Affairs Can., [hereinafter Canada-Burk. Faso BIT] (not-
ing internationally recognized standards of corporate social responsibility). 
164 E.g., Agreement between Japan and Ukraine for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investment, Japan-Ukr., Feb. 5, 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
Agreement between the Government of The Republic of Colombia and the Gov-
ernment of The Republic of Turkey Concerning Reciprocal Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments, Colom.-Turk, July 28, 2014, UNCTAD.  
165 E.g., Treaty between he Government of The United State of America and 
the Government of The Republic of Rwanda Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, Feb 19, 2008, USTR; Agree-
ment between The Republic of Guatemala and The Republic of Trinidad and To-
bago on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Guat.-Trin. & 
Tobago, Aug. 13 2013, UNCTAD. 
166 Canada-Burk. Faso BIT, supra note 163, at pmbl. 
167 Id. (“Understanding that investment is a form of sustainable development 
that . . . is critical for the future of national and global economies as well as for the 
pursuit of national and global objectives for development”).  
168 See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, EFTA States-Montenegro, pmbl., Nov. 
14, 2011, EFTA (“Acknowledging the importance of good corporate governance 
and corporate social responsibility for sustainable development, and affirming 
their aim to encourage enterprises to observe internationally recognised guide-
lines and principles in this respect . . . ”).   
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portance of continuing to strengthen and promote human rights169 
or reference the promotion of “sustainable development” as an 
aligned objective of foreign investment.170  These contextual identi-
fiers could be used to demonstrate the importance of human rights 
or sustainable development even in a trade or investment context.  
In addition, any of the preamble language previously identified 
could also be formally used to signal the objectives of an IIA for 
those agreements that specify their aims or objectives, a common 
practice in free trade agreements (FTAs).171  For instance, the EFTA-
Bosnia and Herzegovina FTA notes that the treaty’s objectives are 
based on the respect of human rights and the furtherance of trade 
“in such a way as to contribute to the objective of sustainable de-
velopment.”172  Given the importance tribunals have given to in-
terpreting standards of treatment in light of their object and pur-
pose, specifying human rights respect or protection, or similar 
language, in the objectives of the treaty ensures that the interpreta-
tion of other indeterminately worded treaty provisions are inter-
preted in line with human rights goals.173 
                                                 
169 See Association Agreement between the European Union and the Europe-
an Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the One Part, and 
Georgia of the Other, EU-Geor., Aug 30, 2014, O.J. (L 261) 4 [hereinafter EU-Geor. 
Association Agreement] (stating the commitment of the parties “to further 
strengthening respect for fundamental freedoms, human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities, democratic principles, the rule of law, 
and good governance, based on common values of the Parties”); see also Free 
Trade Agreement, EFTA States-Bosn. & Herz., June 24, 2013, EFTA [hereinafter 
EFTA-Bosn. & Herz. FTA] (“[r]eaffirming their commitment to democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance with their ob-
ligations under international law, including as set out in the United Nations Char-
ter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”); see also Agreement for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment between the Republic of Austria and the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Austria-Nigeria, pmbl., Aug. 4, 2013, UNCTAD (re-
ferring to the international obligations and commitments concerning respect for 
human rights).  
170 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, pmbl., Mar. 2015 
[hereinafter India Model BIT]. 
171  See, e.g., EU-Geor. Association Agreement, supra note 169, at art. 1 (outlin-
ing the objectives of the agreement); see also EFTA-Bosn. & Herz. FTA, supra note 
169, at art. 1 (discussing the objectives of the FTA). 
172 EFTA-Bosn. & Herz. FTA, supra note 169, at art. 1. 
173 Treaties should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the treaty 
terms’ ordinary meanings and in light of their object and purpose.  Vienna Con-
vention Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1115 U.N.T.S. 18232.  See also 
JONATHAN BONNITCHA, SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION UNDER INVESTMENT TREATIES: A 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 351 (James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2014) 
(describing the background of the object and purpose provision). 
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Substantive Obligations 
A second avenue by which human rights observance by busi-
nesses can be inserted into IIAs is by specifying substantive obliga-
tions for investors that align with human rights protection.  For in-
stance, several IIAs now include provisions entitled “Corporate 
Social Responsibility.”174  These provisions range in content from 
requiring the treaty parties to promote the concept of corporate so-
cial responsibility to obliging treaty parties to encourage corpora-
tions to incorporate internationally recognized standards of corpo-
rate social responsibility in their practices and policies.175  While 
these provisions are directed at states–making them responsible for 
controlling corporate conduct–the Brazil-Malawi IIA imposes cor-
porate social responsibility obligations on the investors themselves.  
Thus, the IIA requires investors to develop “best efforts” to, among  
other obligations, respect the human rights of those involved in the 
companies’ activities, stimulate economic, social, and environmen-
tal progress, create employment opportunities and facilitate access 
of workers to professional training, and develop and apply effec-
tive self-regulatory practices and management systems that foster 
trust between companies and society.176   
The Brazil-Malawi IIA presents an interesting template for im-
posing human rights obligations directly on investors.  While the 
list of human rights obligations for investors is far from complete, 
it provides a good starting point by listing human rights obliga-
tions relating to the protection of dignity, labor rights, and envi-
ronmental rights.  Moreover, imposing human rights-related obli-
gations on investors on a ‘best efforts’ basis is a pragmatic 
compromise between those who may not want to impose any obli-
                                                 
174  E.g., Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement between the 
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Malawi, Braz.-Malawi, June 25, 
2015, UNCTAD, [hereinafter Brazil-Malawi BIT]; Canada-Burk. Faso BIT, supra 
note 163, at art. 16; Norway Model BIT, art. 31, May 2015; Association Agreement 
between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the Other 
Part, EU-Mold., Aug. 30, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L260) 4 [hereinafter EU-Mold. Associa-
tion Agreement]; Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM 
States, of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of 
the Other Part, art. 196, Oct. 30, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 289/I) 3 [hereinafter 
CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement]. 
175  EU-Mold. Association Agreement, supra note 174; Canada-Burkina Faso 
BIT, supra note 163. 
176 Brazil-Malawi BIT, supra note 174, at art. 9. 
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gations on investors and those who want to impose more.  A ‘best 
efforts’ approach requires investors to take reasonable efforts to 
pursue an aim, but does not necessarily require them to achieve 
it.177  Thus, it imposes positive duties on investors to actively seek 
to engage in fostering human rights but evaluates their efforts in 
doing so, not their results.  This compromise may be essential to 
garnering corporate support for these types of provisions in IIAs. 
However, for IIA treaty parties more ambitious than Brazil and 
Malawi, human rights obligations for investors could be made 
mandatory without a “best efforts” caveat.  Thus, investors and 
their investment could be required to respect human rights; stimu-
late economic, social and environmental progress; create employ-
ment opportunities, etc. Alternatively, as UNCTAD has suggested, 
investors’ mandatory obligations could be passive in nature, such 
as a requirement to refrain from “activity that would violate hu-
man or labour rights, damage the environment, or constitute cor-
ruption.”178   
In terms of which human rights should form the catalogue of 
rights in the IIAs, it may be prudent to draw from areas of interna-
tional law with a significant amount of state consensus on these is-
sues in order to bolster state support.  Thus, rights should be 
drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,179 the 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,180 the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work (“ILO”),181 and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, each of which has significant state 
support.182  While not all of the rights from each of these treaties 
would be appropriate to include, to the extent that the treaty right 
reflects customary international law183 it should arguably be in-
                                                 
177  See generally Duncan French & Tim Stephens, Due Diligence in International 
Law, INT’L. L. ASSOC., Mar. 7, 2014, at 10-11 (discussing the due diligence obliga-
tions of foreign investors in international law). 
178  Development Implications of International Investment Agreements, IIA Moni-
tor No. 2, at 6, UNCTAD (2007). 
179  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 31. 
180 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 32. 
181 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-
Up, adopted on June 18, 1998, ILO (annex revised on June 15, 2010).  
182 The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UN Global Compact,  
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles 
[https://perma.cc/5DAH-PXQJ] (last viewed on Oct. 28, 2016). 
183 The rights espoused in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are 
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cluded as its universal nature is more likely to find support from 
states.  Support for these types of rights should also be more forth-
coming from corporations since the UN Global Compact, which 
enjoys strong corporate support, similarly draws its principles 
from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO, and 
from international environmental law.184 
In addition to requiring investors to adhere to human rights ob-
ligations, human rights obligations can further be imposed on in-
vestors prior to establishing their investment.185  Thus, states can 
condition establishment of an investment into their territory on the 
completion of a human rights impact assessment186 or an environ-
mental impact assessment.187  Impact assessments enable investors 
                                                                                                               
viewed as customary international law, while only certain rights from the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (such as the right to life, the right to 
be free from torture, the prohibition on slavery, etc.) and from the ILO (such as the 
prohibition against systemic racial discrimination; prolonged arbitrary detention, 
etc.) are viewed that way.  In international environmental law, the duty to pre-
vent, reduce and control the risk of environmental harm to other states as well as 
the precautionary principle are, among other principles, considered custom.  See 
Jochen von Bernstorff, The Changing Fortunes of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in International Law, 
19.5 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 903, 913 (2008) (discussing customary international law in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see also UN Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations made upon Ratification or Ac-
cession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations 
under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994) (dis-
cussing customary international law in the context of reservations); see also 
SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, et al., HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A 
REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DIMENSIONS 22 (2011) (acknowledging that 
the UDHR contains principles that could serve as customary international law); 
PHILLIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 116 (3rd ed. 2012); WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 121 (James A. Gross, 
ed., 2003) (2006);. 
184 See The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UN Global Compact, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles 
[https://perma.cc/KN8W-AEC8] (last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
185 See, e.g., J. ANTHONY VAN DUZER et al., INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT INTO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY NEGOTIATORS 104 – 110 (2013) (discussing establishment op-
tions for IIAs). 
186 UN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSLATED: A BUSINESS REFERENCE GUIDE, xvii (2008) 
[hereinafter UN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSLATED] (defining human rights impact as-
sessment).  See also Desiree Abrahams & Yann Wyss, Guide to Human Rights Impact 
Assessment and Management, INT’L BUS. LEADERS FORUM AND INT’L FIN. CORP., 
(2010) (providing an extensive guide to conducting and evaluating human rights 
impact assessments). 
187 See Arianna Broggiato, Exploration and Exploitation of Marine Genetic Re-
sources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction and Environmental Impact Assessment, 4 
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to identify, and to respond to, potential human rights or environ-
mental impacts of the business activities prior to establishing their 
investment.188  Consequently, completing an impact assessment 
can enable investors to proactively minimize human rights or envi-
ronmental problems. 
 
Human Rights Chapter 
An alternative practice for increasing BHR content in IIAs 
would be to add a human rights chapter, akin to specialized labor 
or environment chapters that appear in modern FTAs.189  This 
chapter could be used to delineate states’ commitments to the ma-
jor international human rights treaties, outline areas in which BHR 
issues can be cooperated on and promoted by the state parties,190 as 
well as specify BHR obligations relating to trade and investment.  
A human rights chapter could further require state parties to 
adopt, into their domestic laws, certain BHR obligations.  Thus, 
states could be mandated or encouraged to ensure that their do-
mestic laws and policies provide for, and encourage, high levels of 
corporate respect for human rights191 or be required to adopt regu-
                                                                                                               
EUR. J. RISK REG. 247, note 12 (2013) (discussing issues related to ordering an envi-
ronmental impact assessment); see also Erika L. Preiss, The International Obligation 
to Conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment: The ICJ Case Concerning the Gabciko-
vo-Nagymaros Project, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 310 (1999) (discussing the failure of 
the ICJ to order or mention an environmental impact assessment in its decision in 
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case). 
188 Id.; UN HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSLATED, supra note 186, at xvii. 
189 See, e.g., TPP, supra note 153, at Ch. 19 (Labor) and Ch. 20 (Environment) 
(containing human rights chapter); The United States-Panama Trade Promotion 
Agreement, U.S.-Pan., June 28, 2007, Ch. 16 (Labor) and Ch. 17 (Environment) 
(discussing human rights in the context or labor and environmental issues); see 
also Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006, Ch.17 (Labor) and Ch. 18 
(Environment) (incorporating human rights to labor and environmental matters); 
see also Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, Ch. 17 (Labor) and 
Ch. 18 (Environment) (introducing human right components in relation to labor 
and the environment). 
190 See, e.g., EU Textual Proposal: Trade and Sustainable Development, EU-
U.S. TTIP Negotiations, art. 20(4), Nov. 6, 2015, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153923.pdf (dis-
cussing a cooperation requirement between the treaty parties in promoting corpo-
rate social responsibility). 
191 This is taken from the language in the Environment Chapter of the TPP, 
which states that “[e]ach Party shall strive to ensure that its environmental laws 
and policies provide for, and encourage, high levels of environmental protection 
and to continue to improve its respective levels of environmental protection.”  
TPP, supra note 153, at art. 20.3. 
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lations governing corporate responsibility for human rights.192  
This would leave the onus on the state to self-determine which 
regulations are necessary for corporations to respect human rights 
or the scope of corporate responsibility.  
Alternatively, parties could specify the precise obligations that 
states and corporations should bear in this regard, leaving less dis-
cretion to the individual state on the means of implementation.  
Thus, states could be required to adopt regulations which mandate 
that, for instance, corporations conduct due diligence on their sup-
ply chains, adopt codes of conduct, disclose their greenhouse gas 
emissions or conduct a human rights impact assessment for every 
corporate project over a certain financial threshold.  
 
Remedies 
Finally, as BHR treaty proponents are eager to improve access 
to remedies for human rights victims, a remodeling of the dispute 
settlement mechanism in IIAs could provide a solution.  Currently, 
in many IIAs, investment arbitration only permits investors to ini-
tiate actions against the state for breaches of treaty standards.  
Nevertheless, the process of investment arbitration could be recon-
figured to allow either individual claimants or states to pursue 
claims against the investor for failure to comply with the human 
rights obligations of the treaty.  The award rendered could be in 
the form of monetary damages directly paid to the victims or paid 
out to the state, which would then be in charge of distributing the 
remedy.  
Alternatively, breaches of the human rights obligations im-
posed on investors could be remedied in the courts of the home 
state of the investor.  An early draft of the 2015 Indian Model BIT 
included a provision to this effect, stating that investors: 
[S]hall be subject to civil actions for liability in the judicial 
process of their Home State for the acts, decisions or omis-
sions made in the Home State in relation to the Investment 
where such acts, decisions or omissions lead to significant 
damage, personal injuries or loss of life in the Host State.193 
                                                 
192 This language is found in the TPP’s Labor Chapter:  “Each Party shall 
adopt and maintain statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder, governing 
acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, 
and occupational safety and health.”  TPP, supra note 153, at art. 19.3(2). 
193 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 13.1, March 
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This provision was followed by the requirement that the host 
state ensures that its laws allow for the adjudication of extra-
territorial disputes.194 
Moreover, breaches of human rights obligations can be adjudi-
cated through investment arbitration by way of the state bringing a 
counter claim in an investment dispute initiated by the investor.  
The ICSID Convention already permits states to bring counter-
claims connected to the subject-matter of the dispute and the re-
cently negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) al-
lows states to use counterclaims as a set off mechanism.195  Thus, 
human rights issues stemming from the investment dispute in 
question are already subject to counterclaims and could be used as 
a set-off vehicle where the TPP is in question.  However, the scope 
for counterclaims could be further expanded to enable states to ini-
tiate a counterclaim for breach of any human rights or related trea-
ty provision without the requirement that it have a connection to 
the subject-matter of the dispute, a practice for which the TPP ar-
guably acts as a precedent.196   
Besides relying on investment arbitration, unique mechanisms 
for remedying human rights violations could be specified in the 
agreements themselves.  For example, in the TPP’s Environment 
chapter, parties are required to “ensure that judicial, quasi-judicial 
or administrative proceedings for the enforcement of its environ-
mental laws are available under its law and that those proceedings 
are fair, equitable, transparent and comply with due process of 
law.”197  Thus, states are required, as part of the agreement’s obli-
gations, to have in place, or to create, proper judicial mechanisms 
to address environmental issues.  An IIA could similarly contain 
                                                                                                               
2015, [hereinafter India Model BIT].  The text of the Model BIT was revised in De-
cember 2015 and this provision was removed.  Model Text for the Indian Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Annex. 
194  India Model BIT, supra note 193, at art. 13.2. (“The Home State shall en-
sure that their legal systems and rules allow for, or do not prevent or unduly re-
strict, the bringing of court actions on their merits before their domestic courts re-
lating to the civil liability of Investors and Investments for damages resulting 
from alleged acts, decisions or omissions made by Investments or Investors in re-
lation to their Investments in the territory of the Host State.”).  This provision was 
also removed when the Model BIT was revised in December 2015. 
195 ICSID Convention, art. 46; TPP, supra note 153, at art. 9.18(2). 
196  An earlier version of the India Model BIT enabled states to bring counter-
claims for a range of treaty breaches.  See India Model BIT, supra note 193, at art. 
14.11 (discussing counterclaims under the India Model BIT). 
197 TPP, Environment Chapter, supra note 153, at art. 20.7(3). 
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language requiring states to have or to create judicial/quasi-
judicial/administrative mechanisms to ensure that corporate hu-
man rights obligations are addressed.   
Alternatively, remedies for corporate human rights violations 
could be addressed through a consultation process.  The TPP’s La-
bour chapter, for instance, provides that state parties may enter in-
to consultations on any matter specified in the labour chapter, and 
if unable to resolve the matter through consultations, may seek the 
input of the Labour Council–composed of governmental repre-
sentatives from each state party–for assistance in its resolution.198  
Similarly, an IIA could establish a Human Rights Council, com-
posed of representatives from each state party, whose objective 
would include the development of practices and policies relating to 
BHR issues, and to have this Council resolve BHR issues–through 
conciliation or mediation–if state parties are unable to do so 
through consultations.  
Beyond these reconfigurations of IIAs, there remain a host of 
possibilities of further inciting IIAs to align with human rights–
including emphasizing the host state’s ability to regulate,199 carving 
out human rights issues from investment treaty obligations,200 and 
relying on exception provisions,201 among others.202  Yet, because 
these possibilities do not focus on providing direct obligations for 
businesses to further human rights issues, they extend beyond the 
comparable duties that a BHR treaty would seek to impose on 
                                                 
198  TPP, Labour Chapter, supra note 153, at art. 19.15. 
199 See, e.g., EU-Geor. Association agreement, supra note 169, at art. 228 (dis-
cussing domestic labor and environmental protections). 
200  See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement between the government of Australia and 
the government of The People’s Republic of China, Austl.-China, Dec. 20, 2015, 
Dep’t Foreign Affairs and Trade (creating a general exception for human 
measures necessary to protect human health); see also Can.-Burk. Faso BIT, supra 
note 163, at art. 18 (establishing a general exception for human health protection).  
201 Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway to the Incorporation of 
Human Rights in International Investment Law, 49 COLUM. J. OF TRANSN’TL. L. 670 
(2011). 
202 Other possibilities include periodic review of the IIA for compliance with 
corporate social responsibility (e.g., Agreement between Japan and the Oriental 
Republic of Uruguay for the Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ment, Japan-Uru., Jan. 26, 2015) or the filing of annual human rights reports re-
porting on the human rights effect of the IIA in the country (e.g., Agreement Con-
cerning Annual Reports on Human Rights and Free Trade between Canada and 
the Republic of Colombia, Can.-Colom., May 27, 2010, Global Affairs Can.).  
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MNCs and are therefore beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion.   
 
5.  EVALUATING RECONFIGURED INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS 
 
Reconfiguring IIAs to promote the business and human rights 
agenda will undoubtedly not achieve all the same goals as a treaty 
devoted only to business and human rights.  IIAs are vehicles for 
investment and trade liberalization, meaning that their aims and 
scope will differ from a treaty focused only on business and human 
rights issues.  Yet despite its more limited scope, the question re-
mains whether a reconfigured IIA can effectively address the most 
important business and human rights issues that would be found 
in a BHR treaty.  This Part first evaluates the extent to which IIA 
reconfiguration can address BHR treaty goals as well as the relative 
importance of focusing on IIAs over a BHR treaty and then ad-
dresses the pragmatic difficulties IIA reconfiguration may pose.  
 
5.1.   IIA Reconfiguration versus A BHR Treaty 
 
Of the six main arguments put forward by BHR treaty propo-
nents for the creation of a treaty—addressing governance gaps, 
cataloguing BHR issues in one central source, creating binding law, 
leveling the playing field, and providing access to effective reme-
dies—a reconfigured IIA would address all but the cataloguing of 
BHR issues in one place.  This is because as non-multilateral 
agreements, IIAs do not centralize their obligations and, according-
ly, they would not be able to centralize a catalogue-list of BHR is-
sues.  Nevertheless, FTAs—particularly mega-regional agreements 
akin to the TPP—could comprehensively detail BHR issues for a 
number of different countries in one location. 
Moreover, because IIAs are concluded on a bilateral or regional 
basis—rather than on a multilateral basis as the BHR treaty would 
be—governance gaps, uneven playing fields, and access to effec-
tive remedies could remain if states fail to reconfigure their IIAs to 
include BHR issues.  However, if the TPP and the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are representative of global 
trends, more and more countries are moving toward multi-party 
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IIAs with definitive nods to human rights issues, suggesting that 
governance gaps resulting from IIAs may be fewer and far be-
tween.  
Indeed, from a practical standpoint, one of the primary reasons 
to focus on reconfigured IIAs over a dedicated BHR treaty is be-
cause the former involves the consent of a fewer number of states 
as opposed to the roughly 200 states that must consent to the latter.  
Yet there are other reasons why reconfigured IIAs may, in fact, 
even be preferable to focusing on a specialized BHR treaty. 
One important reason for focusing on IIAs is because of the 
importance of foreign investment to the global marketplace.  For-
eign direct investment (“FDI”) is one of the key drivers of the 
world’s economy and the growth in FDI has been accompanied by 
a corresponding growth in MNCs.203  Thus, many of the human 
rights problems a BHR treaty would seek to correct are propagat-
ed, or at least facilitated, by MNC use of FDI practices.  Moreover, 
the regulatory framework for FDI—of which IIAs are a significant 
portion—governs the rights of MNCs without imposing any obli-
gations upon them.204  It therefore seems prudent to impose obliga-
tions on MNCs in the same treaties which facilitate their corporate 
activities and provide them with significant rights, rather than re-
sorting to a separate treaty.   
In fact, creating a separate BHR treaty seems to reinforce the 
idea that foreign investment and human rights issues are two dis-
tinct issues.205  As argued in Part I of this article, the fragmented 
development of investment and trade law, on the one hand, and 
human rights law on the other, enables the regulatory framework 
                                                 
203  Global Agenda Council on Global Trade and FDI, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment as a Key Driver for Trade, Growth and Prosperity: The Case for a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment, 11 (2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
GAC13/WEF_GAC_GlobalTradeFDI_FDIKeyDriver_Report_2013.pdf; STEPHEN 
D. COHEN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 12 
(2007).  
204  Indeed, a recent study has found that large MNCs are the primary bene-
ficiaries of investment arbitration.  See Gus Van Harten & Pavel Malysheuski, Who 
Has Benefited Financially from Investment Treaty Arbitration? An Evaluation of the Size 
and Wealth of Claimants, Osgoode Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 14, 2016, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2713876. 
205  See Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Report of the 
Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, 65-99 (Apr. 13, 
2006) (showing that human rights and international investment law are consid-
ered separate self-contained regimes). 
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in each of the areas to develop in isolation and perpetuates gov-
ernance gaps within which MNCs can continue to violate human 
rights with impunity.  Given the amount of FDI activity by 
MNCs,206 the need to further delineate human rights obligations 
for MNCs in IIAs is highly imperative.  Indeed, for this reason, in 
some ways, while continuing to develop BHR issues in a special-
ized regime remains important, further legalizing BHR issues into 
IIAs may be even more prudent. 
 
5.2.  Practical Difficulties with Reconfigured IIAs 
 
Reconfigured IIAs may therefore address many of the aims of a 
BHR treaty while also reinforcing the importance of human rights 
in relation to MNCs foreign investment activity.  Yet while focus-
ing on reconfiguring IIAs may be prudent, practical difficulties 
with the process of reconfiguring IIAs remain. 
One of the problems with focusing on reconfiguring IIAs is the 
rare, but accelerating departure of several states from their IIAs.  
Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia have exited the entire IIA system 
altogether, and South Africa has begun to terminate its IIAs as well 
in order to focus on developing a domestic investment law frame-
work instead.207  Several other states have terminated individual 
BITs and some states have indicated an intention to terminate BITs 
in the near future.208  Nevertheless, exits from IIAs represent only a 
very small percentage of IIAs,209 indicating that the vast majority of 
states will continue to participate in the IIA system and will there-
fore be able, at least theoretically, to reconfigure their IIAs. 
A second problem is state interest in reconfiguring IIAs.  As 
with the conclusion of the BHR treaty, it is likely that not every 
state will be interested in reconfiguring their IIAs.  However, un-
                                                 
206 See, e.g., UNCTAD, World Investment Report, supra note 104, at xiv 
(showing that FDI activity by MNCs from developing countries alone accounted 
for USD 454 billion). 
207  White & Case, LLP, Treaty Developments Related to Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela, LEXOLOGY, Oct. 1, 2007, 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5361feec-5c73-48c1-9414-
482671f97326 [https://perma.cc/X5HL-RAG2]; Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, 
Investment Treaties over Time - Treaty Practice and Interpretation in a Changing World 
7, OECD, (Working Papers on Int’l Investment, Paper No. 2, 2015). 
208  Gordon & Pohl, supra note 191, at 18-19. 
209  Id.  The authors estimate treaty exit of one percent. 
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like the BHR treaty, state interest in further including social rights 
into IIAs is not limited to primarily developing countries.  Thus, 
the United States, Canada, the European Union, Japan and China, 
among other states, have sought to include human rights, labor 
rights, environmental rights, and other social issues into the IIAs 
they conclude.210  In fact, the texts of the TPP and proposed text of 
the TTIP, suggest an enlarged recognition of many of these non-
economic issues.211  While these states may not adopt the full range 
of suggestions for a reconfigured IIA, given their past efforts to 
improve the social policy dimensions of IIAs they may be willing 
to adopt at least some of the recommendations.   
Moreover, those states that choose to reconfigure their IIAs 
may be able to impose these obligations on less willing states be-
cause of the often asymmetrical bargaining power that arises in the 
conclusion of IIAs, which enables the more dominant state to im-
pose their will on the weaker state.212  In addition, even if some 
states choose not to reconfigure their IIAs, the human rights obliga-
tions may be transferable to non-party MNCs if the state concludes 
a reconfigured IIA with a third party state.  This is because the 
most-favored nation clause found in most IIAs allows parties to ob-
tain benefits granted to third parties.  Assuming that imposing 
human rights obligations on MNCs can be considered a state bene-
fit, a state may be able to claim entitlement to this benefit found in 
a third-party treaty in the same way investors have been able to 
claim investor benefits found in other IIAs.213  
 
                                                 
210  See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 132 (referencing environmental 
and labor rights); Canada-Burkina Faso BIT, supra note 163 (referencing human 
rights, environmental issues and corporate social responsibility); see also EU-
Georgia Association Agreement, supra note 169 (referencing human rights, envi-
ronmental rights, and preservation of cultural heritage); see also Free Trade 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, Austl.-China, Dec. 20, 2015, Dep’t Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (referencing environmental issues and preservation of culture); see also 
Agreement between Japan and Mongolia for Economic Partnership, Japan-Mong., 
Feb. 10, 2015, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (referencing  labor and environmental 
rights). 
211  See, e.g., Trans Pacific Partnership, supra note 153, at ch. 19, 20; Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade and Sustainable Development, 
Nov. 6, 2015. 
212  De Man & Wouters, supra note 155, at 19. 
213 See generally Zachary Douglas, The MFN Clause in Investment Arbitration: 
Treaty Interpretation Off the Rails, 2(1) J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 97 (2011) (discuss-
ing how investors have sought to make use of the MFN clause). 
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Finally, use of investment arbitration as a means of providing 
access to a remedy for human rights victims may be problematic.  
The first problem relating to this issue arises if an IIA permits 
states or individuals to initiate arbitration against an MNC for vio-
lating its human rights obligation.  As arbitration is based on con-
sent—and an MNC would be unlikely to provide its consent in this 
instance—the arbitral tribunal would not have jurisdiction to pre-
side over the dispute.214  For that reason, the idea of allowing the 
host state to adjudicate the MNC’s responsibility or allowing a 
state to initiate a counterclaim against an MNC for violating its 
human rights obligations is preferable.215  Similarly, enabling an 
IIA’s Human Rights Council to mediate or conciliate over such a 
dispute or allowing states to engage in consultations over the issue 
could be a superior solution.  Alternatively, if states wish to use the 
practice of being able to initiate arbitrations against MNCs, IIAs 
would need to contain a provision indicating that foreign investors 
have ex ante consented to arbitration in instances of human rights 
violations.216   
Second, human rights victims seeking a remedy through a 
counterclaim in investment arbitration would have their dispute 
settled by an investment arbitral tribunal—tribunals that are usual-
ly composed of investment experts and that may not have a thor-
ough knowledge of human rights law.  In fact, there has been a 
marked lack of appreciation by tribunals of the interconnections 
between investment and human rights law in several previous dis-
putes.217  Thus, it is unclear whether an investment arbitral tribunal 
                                                 
214 UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement – 2.3 Consent to Arbitration, UNCTAD, 1 
(2003) (“Arbitration is always based on a consent agreement between the par-
ties…[in] ICSID arbitration…the host State may make a general offer to foreign 
investors … to submit to arbitration …To perfect a consent agreement, the inves-
tor has to accept this offer…”). 
215 However, it is recognized that enabling only the state to bring an action 
against the MNC (as the latter suggestion contemplates)—and not individual vic-
tims—may compromise victims’ access to remedies in states which are unwilling 
or unable to act against the MNC.  That being said, if the state is being sued by the 
MNC in international arbitration, it may be more willing to act against the MNC 
that under normal circumstances. 
216 See UNCTAD, Dispute Settlement, supra note 214 (stating that in an in-
vestment arbitration, there is a standing offer to arbitrate from the state).  To use 
investment arbitration against investor interests, a similar provision would need 
to be drafted specifying that foreign investors have undertaken a general offer to 
submit to arbitration in instances of human rights violations and that to perfect 
the consent agreement, the state has to accept this offer. 
217 See, e.g., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. The Argentine 
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would be able to adequately adjudicate the MNCs human rights 
obligations.  However, this shortcoming could be addressed by ei-
ther appointing arbitral tribunal members with a strong human 
rights background or by providing the tribunal with expert opin-
ions on the human rights implications of the dispute.  Moreover, if 
the newly proposed permanent international investment court218 
gains wider support219 and becomes the new mechanism for re-
solving investment disputes, it is likely that human rights argu-
ments will be more accepted in the context of investment disputes 
as the judges of the court are required to have a knowledge of pub-
lic international law (which includes international human rights 
law) and not just investment or trade law.220  In addition, both 
judges of the international investment court and arbitral tribunal 
members are likely to be better able to understand the human 
rights obligations of an MNC in an investment dispute in instances 
where the underlying treaty clearly outlines the MNC’s human 
rights obligations. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
The symbolic importance of concluding a BHR treaty cannot be 
underestimated.  Compiling the obligations of business relating to 
human rights in one central document and with the approval and 
understanding of all the world’s states would be an incredible ac-
complishment.  It would be the first wide-scale treaty to not only 
impose binding human rights obligations on corporations but to 
provide redress to the multitude of human rights victims who 
have, in the past, not been able to seek an effective remedy.  More-
over, it would reinforce the notion that the advantages of globali-
zation that corporations have managed to benefit from are also ac-
companied by obligations. 
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At the same time, compartmentalizing BHR issues into a spe-
cialized treaty risks norm development through IIAs undermining 
human rights issues when the issues intersect.  Moreover, as the 
regulatory framework for international trade and investment 
evolves without due attention to human rights issues, it facilitates 
the creation of governance gaps within which MNCs can violate 
human rights.  For this reason, the BHR agenda should be inserted 
into IIAs, particularly since the pragmatic difficulties with drafting 
a BHR treaty as well as having it ratified are, at the moment, exten-
sive.   
Reconfiguring IIAs to better reflect BHR issues also offers ad-
vantages that the BHR treaty may not be able to provide.  For one, 
they can offer the opportunity to impose human rights obligations 
on corporations from the outset, allowing human right issues to be 
addressed proactively.  Second, they contain a robust enforcement 
mechanism that could provide effective remedies to human rights 
victims.  Most importantly, however, they provide a tool in which 
corporate rights stand parallel to their obligations.  
Undoubtedly, a BHR treaty is an admirable goal, one that may 
be worth fighting for, but given the history of the BHR movement 
it may be a goal that remains out of reach in the foreseeable future.  
Reconfigured IIAs, on the other hand, serve many of the same 
goals as the BHR treaty and ensure that IIAs and human rights 
norms evolve concurrently, and for these reasons, may be worth 
the attention of BHR treaty proponents.  
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